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ABSTRACT
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) protects individuals with disabilities from 
discrimination in the housing or rental markets.  The FHA’s no-inquiry regulation 
prohibits a landlord from inquiring into an applicant’s health condition.  Although the 
FHA routinely has been applied to long-term care facilities – usually to protect a group 
home or similar facility from unfair zoning practices – the no-inquiry regulation has not 
been utilized to challenge the admissions practices of assisted living facilities, nursing 
facilities, and other long-term care facilities.  Indeed, at first glance, a no-inquiry rule 
seems a poor fit for a facility that provides health care along with housing.  This article 
determines that the no-inquiry regulation can be used to limit the health care information
demanded of applicants by long-term care facilities.  An explicit exception to the no-
inquiry regulation allows inquiry to the extent necessary to determine whether an
applicant is entitled to priority in admission.  Because long-term care facilities are 
designed for use by individuals with disabilities, such individuals should be considered to 
have priority.  The facility should be entitled to inquire into an applicant’s health 
condition only to the extent necessary to determine whether he or she has care needs that 
fit within the level of care authorized under the facility’s license.
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Introduction
The Fair Housing Act’s no-inquiry regulation prohibits a landlord from inquiring 
into the health condition of an applicant for tenancy.2  Most observers immediately will 
recognize this regulation as good public policy in the context of a standard residential 
setting.  In all or virtually all such circumstances, a tenant’s health care problems and 
needs are, in the vernacular, none of the landlord’s business.
What is far from obvious, however, is whether and how the FHA’s no-inquiry 
regulation is to be applied when a landlord also is a care provider for tenants.  What if, 
for example, the landlord provides services as the operator of a long-term care facility 
such as a nursing facility3 or assisted living facility?4
In such situations, public policy considerations do not lead immediately to an 
obvious conclusion.  On one hand, a tenant’s health care now is indeed the landlord’s 
business.  A counterargument is that the landlord/operator should not be discriminating
2 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c).
3
 “Nursing facility” is the term used by federal law to refer to the facilities that are known in the vernacular 
as “nursing homes.”  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(Medicare certification for “skilled nursing facility”), 1396r 
(Medicaid certification for “nursing facility”).  This article uses the term “nursing facility,” although 
numerous quotations within the article use “nursing home” instead.
4
 As is discussed subsequently, assisted living differs significantly from state to state.  See infra at ___.   
Even the name “assisted living” is not universal across states.  A decreasing minority of states use other 
terms – for example, “residential care facility for the elderly” in California, “housing with services 
establishment” in Minnesota, and “personal care home” in Pennsylvania.”  See Cal. Health & Safety Code 
§ 1569.1; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144D.01(4); 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1001; see also Eric Carlson, Critical Issues in 
Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who’s Providing the Care, at 72-73 (2005) (chart of names 
used by states).  This article uses the term “assisted living facility” generically to refer to these facilities.
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on the basis of an applicant’s health care condition, beyond making a threshold 
determination that the facility can meet the applicant’s needs. The FHA’s intent would 
seem to be contradicted by a landlord/operator who cherrypicks those applicants with the 
“easiest” health care needs. Such discrimination could be prevented or at least inhibited 
by consistent application of a no-inquiry rule.
This article is the first in- depth analysis of this issue.5 The article first explains 
the basic structure and purpose of the FHA and its no-inquiry regulation.6  Then the 
5
 The author of this article began discussion of the issue in a short article co-written with Michael Allen, 
Why Does the Business Manager Need My Complete Medical History? An Examination of Housing 
Dis crimination in Long-Term Care, 16 NAELA News 1 (Mar. 2004).  Mr. Allen subsequently addressed 
the same issue briefly within an article that he co-wrote with Robert Schwemm, For the Rest of Their 
Lives: Seniors and the Fair Housing Act, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 121, 186-93 (2004).  Also, a student note 
discusses the issue obliquely.  See Lauren Sturm, Fair Housing Issues in Continuing Care Retirement 
Communities (CCRCs): Can Residents be Transferred Without Their Consent?, 6 N.Y. City L. Rev. 119, 
127 (2004) (suggesting that application of the no-inquiry regulation might be unworkable in the context of 
continuing care retirement communities).
The issue is not addressed in any published ruling of a court or administrative agency.  A 2002 consent 
order enforces the no-inquiry regulation against the Resurrection Retirement Community of Chicago, but 
the order applies only to areas of the community in which the landlord does not provide long-term care 
services.
     Specifically, the consent order states that the community “provides both housing with no assisted living 
services and housing with assisted living services.”  Evidently, the Consent Order applies to the 
independent living section of the community, and not the assisted living section, based on the provision of 
the Consent Order that enjoins the community from “[s]teering persons with a disability from [the 
community] to assisted living facilities because of their disability.” Consent Order, United States v.
Resurrection Retirement Community, Inc., No. 02-CV-7453 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2002), available at
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article describes nursing facilities and assisted living facilities, with an overview of the 
law governing each type of facility.
The article then analyzes how the FHA should be applied to long-term care 
facilities.  The analysis considers three primary questions:
• Does the FHA apply to long-term care facilities?
• Does the FHA’s no-inquiry regulation apply to both applicants and tenants, or 
only to tenants?
• Are inquiries by long- term care facilities authorized by one of the explicit 
exceptions to the no-inquiry regulation?
The article concludes that a long-term care facility has authority to make a limited inquiry 
into an applicant’s health condition.  Any inquiry must be limited to the information
necessary to determine whether the applicant can benefit from the facility’s services, and 
whether the applicant’s needs can be met within the parameters of the facility’s license.
www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/resurrectsettle.htm; see also
www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/resurrectcomp.htm (complaint in same case).  In any case, the 
consent order never raises or discusses the issue as to whether and how the no-inquiry regulation can be 
reconciled with a long-term care provider’s legitimate need for residents’ health care information.
6
 Disability-based discrimination also is addressed by the Americans with Disabilities Act and (for 
federally-funded entities) by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Section 504), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (ADA’s Title III, pertaining to public accommodations).  Although the ADA and 
Section 504 each potentially could be relevant in an admission dispute involving a long-term care facility, 
neither is analyzed in this article.  The focus of this article is on the FHA because only the FHA has an 
explicit no-inquiry rule applicable to housing.
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Fair Housing Act (FHA)
FHA Overview
The original Fair Housing Act (FHA) was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, proscribing discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, and 
national origin.7  In 1974, “sex” was added as a proscribed factor of discrimination;8 in 
1988, the Fair Housing Amendments Act added “familial status” and “handicap”.9
Regarding handicaps, a House Report from the 1988 legislation notes:
Prohibiting discrimination against individuals with handicaps is a major 
step in changing the stereotypes that have served to exclude them from 
American life.  These persons have been denied housing because of 
misperceptions, ignorance, and outright prejudice.10
“Handicap” is construed broadly.  The FHA defines “handicap” as “a physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life 
activities,” and includes instances in which an individual has “a record of having such an 
impairment” or is “regarded as having such an impairment.”11  The regulations set forth a 
lengthy but non-exclusive list of examples of a physical or mental impairment.12  The 
7 Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968).
8 Pub. L. No. 93-383, Title VIII, § 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 729 (1974).
9 Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(a)-(b)(2), (e), 102 Stat. 1622 (1988).
10 H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179.
11
 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,245 (Jan. 23, 1989) (FHA’s definition of “handicap” 
is consistent with definition of “individual with handicaps” in Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706).
12
 “Physical or mental impairment includes:
“(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or 
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term “major life activities” also is described broadly, as “functions such as caring for 
one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning and working.”13  Notably, the definition of “handicap” under the FHA is 
substantially equivalent to the definition of “disability” used by the Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act,14 and by the Americans with Disabilities Act.15
more of the following body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, 
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; disgestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; 
skin; and endocrine; or
“(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional 
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. The term physical or mental impairment includes, but is 
not limited to, such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral 
palsy, autism, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus infection, mental retardation, emotional illness, drug addiction (other than 
addiction caused by current, illegal use of a controlled substance) and alcoholism.”
24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a).
13
 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b).
14 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities”).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual”).
     As the ADA reflects, “disability” now is preferred over “handicap” as the legal term of art.  See also, 
e.g., Damon Rose, Don’t Call Me Handicapped!, BBC News Magazine (Oct. 4, 2004), available at 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/3708576.stm.  In this article, the term “handicap” is used because that is the 
term employed by the Fair Housing Act.  
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The FHA is enforceable either through private litigation or by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).16  Actions brought by HUD may be 
adjudicated in front of an administrative law judge or a federal court.17
FHA’s No-Inquiry Regulation
To a significant extent, the FHA’s regulations merely restate the broad statutory 
prohibitions against handicap-based discrimination.  In the FHA itself, the two principal 
subsections proscribe discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the terms of 
the sale or rental.18  The corresponding regulatory language is virtually word-for-word 
identical to the statutory language.19
16
 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610 (enforcement through HUD), 3613 (private litigation).
17
 42 U.S.C. § 3612.
18 Under these two subsections, it is unlawful
“(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer 
or renter because of a handicap of--
“(A) that buyer or renter,
“(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made 
available; or
“(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
“(2) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a 
handicap of--
“(A) that person; or
“(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made 
available; or
“(C) any person associated with that person.”
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2).
Fair Housing Is Good Medicine
Page 7
One exception to this mirror-image pattern of the statute and regulations is the 
inclusion in the regulations of a provision that prohibits an owner or landlord from 
inquiring into whether an applicant has a handicap, or into the nature or severity of such a 
handicap.20  On the release of the proposed FHA regulations dealing with disability, 
HUD explained that this provision was meant to advance legislative intent:
The legislative history of the Fair Housing Amendments Act makes it 
clear that the Act was intended to prohibit landlords and owners [from]
asking prospective tenants and buyers blanket questions about the 
individuals’ disabilities.  The House Report explains that the approach 
taken in section 50421 regulations dealing with pre-employment inquiries 
should apply also to the Fair Housing Amendments Act. House Report at 
30.22 Under section 504 regulations, employers may not inquire, as part of 
pre-employment inquiries, whether an applicant is a handicapped person.
Employers may only make pre[-]employment inquires into an applicant’s 
ability to perform job-related functions.  See 45 CFR 84.14; 24 CFR 
8.13.23
19 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2) with 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a)-(b).
20
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c).
21
 “Section 504” refers to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  Section 504 
prohibits disability-based discrimination by an entity receiving federal funding.
22 H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2191.
23 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,001 (Nov. 7, 1988); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,246 (Jan. 23, 1989) 
(discussion of final regulations, identifying no-inquiry regulation as “adaptation of the ‘pre-employment 
inquiries’ provision in the section 504 regulations”).
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The House Report raises the no-inquiry issue in the context of the FHA’s proviso 
that none of its provisions require making a dwelling available to an individual who 
would be a “direct threat” to others’ health and safety, or whose tenancy would result in 
“substantial physical damage” to others’ property.24  The Report concludes that a 
landlord legally could inquire “whether the individual has engaged in acts that would 
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants,”25 but would be prohibited by
the FHA from making general inquiries relating to handicaps:
This provision [regarding “direct threat” and “physical damage”] is not 
intended to give landlords and owners the right to ask prospective tenants 
and buyers blanket questions about the individuals’ disabilities.  Under 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, employers may not inquire, as part 
of pre-employment inquiries, whether an applicant is a handicapped 
person or as to the nature or severity of the handicap.  Employers may 
only make pre-employment inquiries into an applicant's ability to perform 
job-related functions.  Similarly, under this provision, only an inquiry into 
a prospective tenant's ability to meet tenancy requirements would be 
justified.  Thus, in assessing an application for tenancy, a landlord or 
owner may ask an individual the questions that he or she asks of all other 
     The fact that the no-inquiry regulation is drawn in part from legislative intent, and not exclusively from 
statutory language, might raise questions as to its enforceability in private litigation.  See Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)  (no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations 
implementing Title VI of Civil Rights Act).
24
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(d) (corresponding provision in regulation).
25 H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2191.
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applicants that relate directly to the tenancy (e.g., questions relating to 
rental history or a targeted inquiry as to whether the individual has 
engaged in acts that would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of 
other tenants), but may not ask blanket questions with regard to whether 
the individual has a disability.  Nor may the landlord or owner ask the 
applicant or tenant questions which would require the applicant or tenant 
to waive his right to confidentiality concerning his medical condition or 
history.26
As promulgated by HUD, the no-inquiry regulation is applicable whether or not 
an applicant is perceived as potentially threatening to health, safety, or personal property.
In fact, the regulation makes no exception for an applicant’s potential dangerousness.
Housing providers had requested regulatory authorization to inquire into an applicant’s 
“history of antisocial behavior or tendencies,” but HUD declined to include the requested 
exception, reasoning that such an exception “might well be seen as creating or permitting 
a presumption that individuals with handicaps generally pose a greater threat to the health 
or safety of others than do individuals without handicaps.”27  Presumably this was meant 
to be consistent with the House Report’s narrow concession that a landlord or owner
could engage in “a targeted inquiry as to whether the individual has engaged in acts that 
would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants.”28
26 H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2191.
27
 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,247 (Jan. 23, 1989); see also Township of W. Orange v. Whitman, 8 F. Supp. 2d 
408, 433 n.15 (D. N.J. 1998) (in camera review of medical histories of allegedly dangerous residents, in 
lawsuit by township to prevent operation of group homes).
28 H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2191.
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In recognition that a landlord or owner under certain circumstances might have a 
legitimate need to inquire into an applicant’s handicap, the no-inquiry regulation includes 
limited exceptions.  Two of these exceptions concern the use of illegal drugs, and are not 
relevant here.29  The other exceptions permit inquiry if the handicap relates to “an 
applicant’s ability to meet the requirements of ownership or tenancy,” or if a dwelling or 
priority for a dwelling is available only to persons with handicaps or persons with a 
particular type of handicap.30  These exceptions typically arise in regard to federally-
funded housing developments that require or prefer tenants with handicaps.31
The most-commonly cited case regarding the no-inquiry regulation, Cason v. 
Rochester Housing Authority, concerns a public housing authority that screened 
applicants for an “ability to live independently, or to live independently with minimal 
29
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(4)-(5).
30
 The exceptions are:
“(1) Inquiry into an applicant’s ability to meet the requirements of ownership or tenancy;
“(2) Inquiry to determine whether an applicant is qualified for a dwelling available only to persons with 
handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap;
“(3) Inquiry to determine whether an applicant for a dwelling is qualified for a priority available to persons 
with handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap.”
24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(1)-(3).
31 See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,001 (Nov. 7, 1988) (discussion of subsidized housing in release of 
proposed no-inquiry regulations); 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,246 (Jan. 23, 1989) (discussion of subsidized 
housing in release of final no-inquiry regulations); see also United States v. Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 
954 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (receipt of federal funds requires apartment building to house only elderly tenants, 
but does not allow discrimination against applicants with handicaps).
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aid.”32  Applicants were required to fill out a questionnaire regarding any medical 
conditions, and to submit to an in-home evaluation conducted by a housing authority 
employee.33  If deemed necessary by the housing authority, these procedures were 
supplemented by a nursing evaluation conducted by a social worker, “during which a 
variety of specific questions concerning the applicant’s disability, personal hygiene and 
ability to live independently [were] asked.”34
The court conducted a limited analysis of the parameters of the no-inquiry 
regulation.  The housing authority’s practices were “clearly at odds” with the regulation,
as the housing authority conceded.35  The court briefly considered the exception relating 
to “an applicant's ability to meet the requirements of ownership or tenancy,” by 
examining the twelve tenant obligations set forth in the federal regulations, and pointing 
out that none of those obligations had any relationship to an individual’s ability to live 
independently.36  Ultimately, the court enjoined the public housing authority from 
making inquiries into an applicant’s ability to live independently.37
Subsequent litigation has explored further how the no-inquiry regulation coexists 
with publicly-funded housing.  The FHA does not invalidate federal funding laws that 
32
 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); see also HUD v. Wilmette Real Estate & Mgmt. Co., 2000 
WL 1478457 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 2000) (consent order against real estate management company, based on 
company’s inquiries to applicants as to their ability to live independently).
33
 748 F. Supp. at 1005.
34
 748 F. Supp. at 1005.
35 748 F. Supp. at 1008-1009.
36
 748 F. Supp. at 1008-1009; see 24 C.F.R. §  966.4(f) (twelve obligations of public housing tenants).
37
 748 F. Supp. at 1011.
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allow a landlord to prefer applicants with certain types of disabilities,38 although the right 
to prefer certain disabilities does not justify screening for an applicant’s ability to live 
independently.39
Exceptions to the no-inquiry regulation are construed narrowly to authorize 
inquiries only to the extent necessary.  In a case decided by the Maine Supreme Court, a 
federally subsidized housing project was limited by the federal funding to elderly or 
disabled tenants.  Although the housing project thus was allowed to require verification 
of an applicant’s disability, the project could not require a physician’s statement 
describing the applicant’s medical condition.40  In a case involving a similar fact pattern –
inquiries made by a project limited to elderly or disabled tenants – a federal district court 
in California emphasized that a landlord’s inquiries should be as restricted as possible:
38 Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apts., Inc., 192 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1999) (National Housing Act allowing 
landlord to admit applicants with physical disabilities but not with chronic mental illness; rejection of 
applicant with “mental-schizo” condition).
39
 Jainniney v. Maximum Independent Living, Memorandum of Opinion, No. CV 0879 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 
2001) (Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act allowing landlord to prefer applicants with 
“similar disabilities,” but not allowing rejection based on applicant’s inability to live independently).
40 Robards v. Cotton Mill Assocs., 713 A.2d 952, 954 (Me. 1998).
The trial court had considered two exceptions: as discussed in this article’s text, the exception for a 
dwelling reserved for individuals with handicaps and, in addition, the exception for “an applicant's ability 
to meet the requirements of ownership or tenancy.”  The trial court made the dubious conclusion that this 
second exception allowed the housing project to inquire into the applicant’s ability to care for himself and 
an apartment.  This issue was not appealed, and thus was not addressed by the Maine Supreme Court.  713 
A.2d at 954; see Cason v. Rochester Housing Authority, 748 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (prohibiting 
public housing authority from inquiring into applicant’s ability to live independently).
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[T]he legislative history of the [Fair Housing Act Amendments Act of 
1988] and the HUD regulations show that an applicant’s privacy rights are 
to be preserved to the extent possible and that a landlord should use the 
least invasive means necessary to verify an applicant’s qualifications. . . .  
[¶]  Although a landlord may make necessary inquiries to determine an 
applicant’s qualifications for tenancy, the landlord may not inquire into 
the nature and extent of an applicant’s or tenant’s disabilities beyond that 
necessary to determine eligibility.41
Long-Term Care Facilities
Nursing Facilities
A nursing facility is the health care facility that the general public is likely to 
identify as a “nursing home” or “convalescent hospital.”  In general, nursing facility 
residents have significant health care needs and, in recent years residents’ average health 
care needs have increased.42  Based on 2004 data, 45 percent of nursing facility residents 
suffer from dementia.43  Over 54 percent of residents are unable to walk without 
extensive or constant support, and another 4.3 percent are in a bed or recliner at least 22 
41 Niederhauser v. Independence Square Hous., 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 16,305, at 
16,305.5 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
42 HHS OIG, Nurse Aide Training, Rep. No. OEI-05-01-00030, at 5, 9-10 (2002), available at 
oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-01-00030.pdf.
43
 Charlene Harrington et al., Nursing Facilities, Staffing, Residents, and Facility Deficiencies, 1998 
Through 2004, at 42 (2005), available at www.nccnhr.org/public/245_1267_11874.cfm.
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hours per day.44  Over 53 and 43 percent of residents suffer from bladder or bowel 
incontinence, respectively, and over 29 percent have contractures that limit the range of 
motion in their joints.45
Health care interventions are a daily fact of life for many nursing facility 
residents.  Over 4 percent of residents have an ostomy, which is an opening in the skin 
(such as a colostomy) that provides direct access to the intestinal or urinary tract.46 Over 
7 percent of residents have indwelling catheter tubes that drain urine from the bladder.47
Almost 7 percent of residents receive tube feeding directly into the gastrointestinal 
system, and over 2 percent of residents receive food or medicine intravenously.48
National nursing facility standards are set in large part by the federal Nursing 
Home Reform Law, enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987.49
The Reform Law governs any nursing facility which is certified to receive reimbursement 
44
 Charlene Harrington et al., Nursing Facilities, Staffing, Residents, and Facility Deficiencies, 1998 
Through 2004, at 36 (2005).
45
 Charlene Harrington et al., Nursing Facilities, Staffing, Residents, and Facility Deficiencies, 1998 
Through 2004, at 38, 52, 54 (2005).
46
 Charlene Harrington et al., Nursing Facilities, Staffing, Residents, and Facility Deficiencies, 1998 
Through 2004, at 46 (2005).
47
 Charlene Harrington et al., Nursing Facilities, Staffing, Residents, and Facility Deficiencies, 1998 
Through 2004, at 56 (2005).
48
 Charlene Harrington et al., Nursing Facilities, Staffing, Residents, and Facility Deficiencies, 1998 
Through 2004, at 48, 50 (2005).
49
 Pub. L. 100-203, §§ 4201 and 4211. Because the Nursing Home Reform Law was part of the 1987 
budget reconciliation bill, the Reform Law also is known as “OBRA ‘87.”
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from the Medicare or Medicaid programs, or both.50 Because over 97 percent of the 
nation’s nursing facilities are certified to participate in at least one of these programs,51
the Reform Law sets care standards for virtually every nursing facility resident in the 
country.
The Reform Law made a sea change in federal nursing facility law, consistent 
with a recommendation of the Institute of Medicine for a revised federal nursing facility 
law “based on the best professional standards for providing high quality of care and 
quality of life.”52 For example, a fundamental provision of the Reform Law requires that 
a nursing facility “provide services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, 
mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident, in accordance with a written plan 
50
 The Reform Law is codified at sections 1395i-3 and 1396r of Title 42 of the United States Code.  Section
1395i-3 applies to any nursing home that accepts Medicare reimbursement; Section 1396r similarly applies 
to any nursing home that accepts Medicaid reimbursement.  Sections 1395i-3 and 1396r are virtually 
identical.
     The Reform Law refers to a Medicare-certified nursing home as a “skilled nursing facility,” and a 
Medicaid-certified nursing home as a “nursing facility.”  42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(a), 1396r(a).  For 
simplicity’s sake, this article refers to each type of facility as a “nursing facility.”
51 HHS, The National Nursing Home Survey: 1999 Summary at 7, available at
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_13/sr13_152.pdf.
52
 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, at 26 (National Academy 
Press 1986).  The Reform Law “was written with both the recommendations of the IOM and [the federal 
government’s notice of proposed rulemaking] as a model.”  56 Fed. Reg. 48,826, 48,826 (1991); see also 
Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 223 F.Supp.2d 73, 79 (D.D.C. 2002) (Nursing Home 
Reform Law “adopted many of the recommendations of the IOM Report”).
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of care” prepared by a multi-disciplinary team headed by the resident’s physician.53
Also, to establish greater professionalism in nursing facility care, the Nursing Home 
Reform Law requires that a nursing facility have a licensed nurse on duty around the 
clock, and employ a professional registered nurse at least eight consecutive hours a day, 
seven days a week.54
Prior to the Reform Law, standards were minimal or nonexistent for those non-
nurses who provide most of the hands-on care in a nursing facility.55  In response, the 
Reform Law established a new job classification – certified nurse aide, or CNA – and 
required that each CNA receive at least 75 hours of training and pass a certification 
examination.56
Assisted Living Facilities
Initial Conceptions
“Assisted living” has been described as a new paradigm in long-term care.57  The 
idealized vision of assisted living is an elder living in her own home, receiving precisely 
the type and frequency of services that she requires.58  Assisted living proponents speak 
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2), 1396r(b)(2).
54
 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4)(C)(i), 1396r(b)(4)(C)(i).
55
 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, at 89-90 (National 
Academy Press 1986); 56 Fed. Reg. 48,826, 48,880 (1991).
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(5)(A), (f)(2)(A)(i), 1396r(b)(5)(A), (f)(2)(A)(i); see also 42 C.F.R. § 483.75(e).
57 See Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A New 
Paradigm for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons? (1993).
58 See, e.g., Marshall Kapp & Keren Brown Wilson, Assisted Living and Negotiated Risk: Reconciling 
Protection and Autonomy, 1 J. Ethics, Law, and Aging 6 (1995); Rosalie Kane, Expanding the Home Care 
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disparagingly of nursing facilities’ standardization, and champion assisted living as the 
flexible and individualized alternative to nursing facility care.59
Among the assisted living model’s virtues, according to these proponents, is its 
ability to preserve residents’ autonomy, dignity, and privacy.60  A laudatory AARP report 
from 1993 states: “Substantial numbers of disabled older people now live in assisted 
living settings where they receive individualized personal care in accommodations that 
offer more privacy, space, and dignity than are typically available in nursing homes, and 
Concept: Blurring Distinctions Among Home Care, Institutional Care, and Other Long-Term Care 
Services, Milbank Quarterly, vol. 73, no. 2, at 161-181 (1995).
59 See, e.g., Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A New 
Paradigm for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons?, at 2 (1993).
60 See, e.g., Assisted Living Quality Coalition, Assisted Living Quality Initiative: Building a Structure that 
Promotes Quality, at 9 (1998) (one purpose of coalition was to “advocat[e] for the assisted living 
philosophy of independence, privacy, dignity and autonomy”); Keren Brown Wilson, Assisted Living: 
Reconceptualizing Regulation to Meet Consumers’ Needs and Preferences 10 (1996) (“Assisted living’s 
philosophy is to provide physically and cognitively impaired older persons the personal and health-related 
services that they require to age in place in a homelike environment that maximizes their dignity, privacy, 
independence, and autonomy”).
     In states’ assisted living definitions, a not unsubstantial number of states refer to “autonomy,” “dignity,” 
and other similarly ambitious terms.  See, e.g., Ill. Admin. Code tit. 77, § 295.100(a) (assisted living as “a 
social model that promotes [residents’] dignity, individuality, privacy, independence, autonomy, and 
decision-making ability”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-7.15 (assisted living “promot[ing] resident self-direction 
and participation in decisions that emphasize independence, individuality, privacy, dignity and homelike 
surroundings”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 7102(11) (“promot[ing] resident self-direction and active 
participation in decision-making while emphasizing individuality, privacy and dignity”). 
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at lower cost.”61  The assisted living facility frequently is praised as being the polar 
opposite of a nursing facility in regard to resident independence and other appealing 
characteristics:
Proponents assert that [assisted living facilities] differ from new nursing 
home facilities and make comparisons when explaining what assisted 
living is.  Nursing facilities are institutional, hospital-like settings that do 
not respect the individual’s need for independence, dignity, and choice.  In 
contrast, [assisted living facilities] provide home-like environments where 
respect for the resident’s independence, dignity, and choice are the 
primary concerns. 62
Assisted Living in Practice
Although, in initial envisionings, assisted living was to be provided in the elder’s 
home,63 assisted living today is normally provided in and by an assisted living facility.64
61 Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A New Paradigm 
for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons?, at vii (1993).
62 Paula Carder, The Social World of Assisted Living, J. Aging Studies, vol. 16, at 1 (2002), reprinted in
Gray Areas: Ethnographic Encounters with Nursing Home Culture 263, 271 (Phillip Stafford ed. 2003)
(internal quotations omitted).
63 See, e.g., Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A New 
Paradigm for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons?, at 86 (1993) (some interviewees retaining position 
that “assisted living is a form of home care”).
64 See, e.g., Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A New 
Paradigm for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons?, at 1 (1993) (assisted living “not a nursing home yet 
not, strictly speaking, community care”); Eric Carlson, Critical Issues in Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s 
Out, and Who’s Providing the Care, at 11-12 (2005).
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Facilities commonly are required to obtain state licenses65  In certain states, the license is 
held by the service provider, which may or may not be the entity responsible for 
providing the housing.66
Today, a realistic description of assisted living would focus on how a facility 
meets elders’ day-to-day needs.  Simply put, an assisted living facility offers housing and 
necessary services to older individuals who (in most instances) need assistance with at 
least some activities of daily living.67
65
 Eric Carlson, Critical Issues in Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who’s Providing the Care, at 
72-73 (2005).  Approximately two-thirds of the states use the term “assisted living” in the license.  Id.  
Other terms include “boarding home,” “home for the aged,” “personal care home,” and “residential care 
facility for the elderly.” Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 18.20.020(1) (boarding home); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 333.20106(3) (home for the aged); 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1001 (personal care home); Cal. Health & Safety 
Code § 1569.2(k) (residential care facility for the elderly).
66
 Robert Mollica et al., State Residential Care and Assisted Living Policy: 2004, at 1-8 through 1-9 (March 
2005); Robert Mollica, Setting Policy for Assisted Living 8 (1995) (“States have adopted one of two 
approaches to regulation: 1) licensure of a program or facility that combines housing and services and 
2) licensure or certification of services provided in assisted living.”).
     The issues discussed in this article may not come into play if housing and services are provided 
independently.  In that situation, the housing provider may be subject to the FHA’s no-inquiry regulation in 
the same way that the regulation is applied to any “typical” landlord. 
67 See, e.g., Assisted Living Federation of American, What Is Assisted Living?, available at 
www.alfa.org/public/articles/details.cfm?id=126 (“defin[ing] an Assisted Living residence as a special 
combination of housing, personalized supportive services and health care designed to meet the needs --
both scheduled and unscheduled -- of those who need help with activities of daily living”); Assisted Living 
Assocs. L.L.C. v. Moorestown Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 415-16 (D.N.J. 1998).
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The extent of these assisted living services differs significantly from state to state, 
as assisted living standards are set almost exclusively by state law.68  To this point, 
federal law is virtually silent on assisted living standards.69
The extent of available services also may vary greatly from facility to facility 
within the same state.  Some states license multiple levels of assisted living; in these 
states, residents with greater needs reside in facilities licensed at a higher level.70  Also, 
although state law may establish the services that an assisted living facility is authorized 
to provide, the law often does not require that such a facility provide all or even most of 
the authorized services.71
Assisted living facilities often are able to make available a significant level of 
health care.  Increasingly, residents who in the past would have required nursing facility
68 See generally Robert Mollica et al., State Residential Care and Assisted Living Policy: 2004 (March 
2005); Eric Carlson, Critical Issues in Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who’s Providing the 
Care (2005).
69
 Eric Carlson, Long-Term Care Advocacy § 5.04[2] (Matthew Bender 2005).
70
 Eric Carlson, Critical Issues in Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who’s Providing the Care, at 
19-21 (2005); see, e.g., Ariz. Admin. Code 9-10-701, -702 (3 licensure levels); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-5-
226 (2)-(4) (same); Code Me. R. 10-149-113, § 2.8 (two licensure levels); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 198.006(16), 
(17) (same); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4651(15)(“enhanced” certification if certain standards are met).
71
 Robert Mollica et al., State Residential Care and Assisted Living Policy: 2004, at 1-20 through 1-22 
(March 2005); Eric Carlson, Critical Issues in Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who’s Providing
the Care, at 33-35 (2005).
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admission, now are able to receive necessary health care services in an assisted living 
facility.72
Is an Assisted Living Facility a “Home”?
Assisted living operators not infrequently claim to provide a “homelike” 
environment,73 but it is unclear to what extent an assisted living facility can be considered 
a “home” like any other.  The 1993 AARP report notes:
The status of residents in newly emerging assisted living programs is less 
clear.  If residents have bachelor apartments with doors that lock from the 
inside or if they have bathrooms and kitchenettes, is their unit a home in 
the real sense or only in the artificial sense of the rhetoric that asks nursing 
home residents to regard the facility as home?  If it is a home in the real 
sense, then the resident should enjoy all the protections of the Fair 
72 See, e.g., Eric Carlson, Critical Issues in Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who’s Providing 
the Care, at 28-32 (2005).
73 See, e..g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-7.15 (assisted living “promot[ing] resident self-direction and 
participation in decisions that emphasize independence, individuality, privacy, dignity and homelike 
surroundings”); Paula Carder, The Social World of Assisted Living, J. Aging Studies, vol. 16, at 1 (2002), 
reprinted in Gray Areas: Ethnographic Encounters with Nursing Home Culture 263, 271 (Phillip Stafford 
ed. 2003) (assisted living “provid[ing] home-like environments where respect for the resident’s 
independence, dignity, and choice are the primary concerns”) (internal quotations omitted); Keren Brown 
Wilson, Assisted Living: Reconceptualizing Regulation to Meet Consumers’ Needs and Preferences 10
(1996) (“Assisted living’s philosophy is to provide physically and cognitively impaired older persons the 
personal and health-related services that they require to age in place in a homelike environment that 
maximizes their dignity, privacy, independence, and autonomy.”).
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Housing Act and should exercise reasonable control over what occurs at 
the premises.74
As discussed above, an assisted living facility may be seen as housing, a service 
provider, or both.75 This uncertainty raises legal questions that depend for their answers 
on the facility’s qualities and practices, and how the facility is characterized.76
For example, when an assisted living resident is injured, the facility is likely to 
argue in its defense that the standard of care is closer to that of an apartment building, 
than of (for example) a nursing facility.  This argument was advanced in a case involving 
a 93 year-old assisted living resident who had drowned in a canal behind the facility.  In 
reversing a directed verdict that had been granted in the facility’s favor, the Florida 
District Court of Appeal noted that the facility “seem[ed] to be arguing that [it] may be 
deemed a ‘living facility’ but . . . not an ‘assisted living facility.’”77  The court rejected 
this argument, reasoning that individuals choose assisted living facilities specifically to 
receive assistance with activities of daily living:
74 Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A New Paradigm 
for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons?, at 10 (1993).
75 See supra at __.
76 See, e.g., Keren Brown Wilson, Assisted Living: Reconceptualizing Regulation to Meet Consumers’
Needs and Preferences i (1996) (“most controversial and unresolved issues in assisted living” including 
“[t]o what extent do assisted living settings function as housing that should be governed by landlord/tenant 
law?” and “[a]re assisted living settings residential settings, or are they care facilities that should be 
governed by protective statutes and regulations?”).
77
 Selvin v. DMC Regency Residence, Ltd., 807 So. 2d 676, 682 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis in 
original).
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There is also a fundamental distinction about the residents in assisted 
living facilities that is not true of the general public. Unlike people who 
choose to live in single family homes, the residents of this assisted living 
facility have their home there because they must. They have been forced 
by the afflictions of age, by deteriorating cognitive and mental acuity as 
well as physical decline, to give up their conventional homes, apartments 
and condominiums they had chosen as permanent places of residence 
when they were active and able. Now their mental and physical 
conditions, however, have made it necessary for their own personal safety 
to live in a place where trained personnel can give them care and attention 
to protect them from the dangers of their failing faculties. In short they 
have turned to assisted living facilities not in the same way that the 
general public chooses ordinary homes -- for simple shelter -- or to visit 
parks and recreation areas, but instead for protection from the ordinary 
risks of everyday life associated with the steady decline in their own 
abilities to look after themselves. What plaintiff appears to claim is that 
this facility failed to exercise due care in the single thing -- the sole 
function -- that made him seek out such a facility.78
In a similar vein to the facility’s “living facility” argument in the Florida appeal, 
assisted living operators have expended considerable time and energy to promote the idea 
78
 Selvin v. DMC Regency Residence, Ltd., 807 So. 2d 676, 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see also
Menorah Campus Independent Senior Apartments, Inc. v. Novello,  __ N.Y.S.2d __, 2005 WL 3749732, 
2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3079 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (no assisted living license required; all care services 
provided by home care agency affiliated with housing provider).
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that, through “negotiated risk agreements,” a facility could have a resident waive the 
facility’s responsibility for certain care needed by the resident.79  A provider attorney 
notes that “[n]egotiated risk agreements are intended to enable residents to reside in a 
non-institutional assisted living setting even though they may have care needs that would 
normally require that they reside in a skilled nursing environment.”80  Under this 
conception of negotiated risk, the assisted living operator hopes to be relieved of 
responsibility for the care need that, absent the negotiated risk agreement, would require 
the resident’s move to a nursing facility.
To this point, no court has issued a ruling that directly addresses the validity of 
the negotiated risk concept.  More generally, the concept of an assisted living facility as 
“home” also is relatively unexamined.
79 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Burgess, Negotiated Risk Agreements In Assisted Living Communities 41 
(Assisted Living Federation of America 1999) (negotiated risk agreement containing “acknowledgment by 
an informed resident that he bears the risk of the choices made as part of the negotiated risk contract”);
Kenneth L. Burgess, Negotiated Risk Agreements – One Year Later, Assisted Living Today, Nov./Dec. 
2001, at 36 (state’s prohibition of liability waivers had “fatally curtailed” negotiated risk); Allen Lynch & 
Sarah Teachworth, Risky Business: The Enforceability and Use of Negotiated Risk Agreements, 1 Seniors 
Housing & Care Journal 5 (2002) (waivers of liability in negotiated risk); see also Eric Carlson, In the 
Sheep’s Clothing of Resident Rights: Behind the Rhetoric of “Negotiated Risk” in Assisted Living, NAELA 
Q., Spring 2003, at 4 (invalidity of liability waivers in negotiated risk agreements).
80
 Joel S. Goldman, Potential Legal Roadblocks Ahead for Assisted Living in ALFA Fall 2001 National 
Conference & Expo Conference Proceedings 299 (Oct. 21-23, 2001), as cited in Allen Lynch & Sarah 
Teachworth, Risky Business: The Enforceability and Use of Negotiated Risk Agreements, 1 Seniors 
Housing & Care Journal 5 n.11 (2002).
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Is a Long-Term Care Facility Barred From Inquiring Into Medical Conditions of 
Applicants or Residents?
Public Policy Considerations
Application of the no-inquiry regulation to long-term care raises two broad issues.  
One issue is akin to the negotiated risk issue mentioned above.81  Across-the-board
application of a do-not-inquire rule would tend to excuse a care provider from knowledge 
of, and responsibility for, a resident’s health condition, similar to how a negotiated risk 
agreement might release a provider from responsibility for a certain aspect or aspects of a 
resident’s care needs.  In either case, important aspects of a resident’s care needs are 
designated as none of the facility’s concern.
The second issue concerns the appropriate and inappropriate uses of applicants’ 
medical information.  An appropriate use is to determine whether the applicant’s care 
needs can be met in a long- term care facility.  Such determinations are particularly 
relevant for assisted living facilities, since their capacity to provide care is less than that 
of nursing facilities.82  Although assisted living facilities now are allowed to 
accommodate a greater range of medical conditions than was the case in the past,83 state 
81 See supra at __.
82 See, e.g., Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A New 
Paradigm for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons?, at 37 (1993) (“Typically a team was involved in 
making initial determinations about suitability for entrance and/or care plans upon admission.”); Assisted 
Living Quality Coalition, Assisted Living Quality Initiative: Building a Structure that Promotes Quality, at 
68 (1998) (assisted living guidelines calling on facility to conduct “initial screening of the applicant to 
determine the setting’s ability to meet the resident’s anticipated health and service needs and preferences”).
83 See supra at __.
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laws continue to bar admission or retention of individuals with certain medical 
conditions.84
Another appropriate use of applicants’ medical information is to conduct 
assessments and prepare service plans.  This is one topic on which providers, regulators, 
and consumer advocates are in agreement – good long-term care requires that a resident’s 
needs be assessed early and often, and that assessments are used to develop 
individualized plans.85
84 See, e.g., Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 290-5-35-.15; R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-17.4-2(9); see also infra at ___.  
Such limitations on admission or retention are subject to challenge as being unduly discriminatory against 
individuals with handicaps.  See, e.g., Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 
1285, 1300-301 (D. Md. 1993) (invalidation under FHA of county requirement that group home residents 
be capable of evacuating independently in an emergency); Baggett v. Baird, 1997 WL 151544, at *14-16, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5825, at *40-49 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (invalidation under FHA of state requirement that 
assisted living residents be ambulatory); Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 19 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571-75 (N.D.W.V. 1998) (refusal to dismiss causes of action 
under ADA and FHA challenging state requirement that assisted living residents be ambulatory).
85 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2)-(3), 1396r(b)(2)-(3) (assessments and care plans in nursing 
facilities); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b), (k) (same); Sarah Greene Burger et al., Nursing Homes: Getting Good 
Care There, at 38-57 (Impact Publishers 2nd ed. 2002); Assisted Living Workgroup, Assuring Quality in 
Assisted Living: Guidelines for Federal and State Policy, State Regulation, and Operations 123-27 (2003)
(unanimous support for recommendations relating to assessments and service plans); Assisted Living 
Quality Coalition, Assisted Living Quality Initiative: Building a Structure that Promotes Quality, at 68 
(1998) (assisted living guidelines providing that “[a]fter execution of a contract and within a reasonable 
time after move-in, the setting conducts a more complete assessment of the resident by an appropriately 
qualified person,” for development of service plan); Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations, 2003-2005 Accreditation Manual for Assisted Living, at 103-104, 112-18 (assessments and 
Fair Housing Is Good Medicine
Page 27
What is not appropriate or permissible is to use medical information to deny 
admission to those residents whose care needs, although appropriate for a facility, may 
require relatively more staff attention, or be perceived as distasteful by staff members or 
other residents.  Statutory authority here is strong, although litigated cases are few and far 
between.  The Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
each prohibit discrimination based on medical condition.86  The most prominent 
published case, Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center, concerns a nursing facility that 
had refused admission to a woman due to her Alzheimer’s disease.87  The federal district 
court ruled in favor of the nursing facility but the Third Circuit reversed, speaking in 
strong terms against disability-based discrimination in admission to long-term care 
facilities:
Here there was ample evidence that [the woman’s] aggressive 
behaviors rendered her . . . a challenging and demanding patient.  We find 
that this fact alone cannot justify her exclusion from a nursing home . . . .  
Otherwise nursing homes would be free to “pick and choose” among 
patients, accepting and admitting only the easiest patients to care for, 
service plans); N.J. Admin. Code tit. 8, § 8:36-7.1 (same); Utah Admin. Code §§ 432-270-12, 432-270-13 
(same).  
86
 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (under ADA, no disability-based discrimination in “place of public 
accommodation”); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (under Section 504, no disability-based discrimination in federally-
funded program or activity); see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (“place of public accommodation” in ADA 
includes “hospital , or other service establishment”).
87
 49 F.3d 1002 (3rd Cir. 1995).
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leaving the more challenging and demanding patients with no place to turn 
for care.88
Thus, across-the-board application of a no-inquiry rule would not necessarily be 
in the interests of long-term care applicants or residents.  Denying access to an 
applicant’s medical information is beneficial to the applicant to the extent that it prevents 
discrimination based on medical condition at the time of admission.  On the other hand, 
denying access seems to be counterproductive if the facility uses the information only to 
deny admission – appropriately -- to those applicants whose medical conditions 
disqualify them for admission under relevant state law.89  Also, denying access may have 
negative consequences to applicants (and residents) to the extent that it fosters the idea
that a long-term care operator is only a “landlord” without responsibility for residents’ 
well-being.
Legal Analysis
Are Long-Term Care Facilities Subject to the FHA?
Case Law
Case law overwhelmingly supports the proposition that long-term care facilities 
are subject to the FHA.  Notably, a heavy majority of the cases relate to zoning or similar 
disputes.  The ubiquitous issue in dispute is whether the property owner (or lessee, in 
some instances) has the right to operate a particular type of facility on the property. 90
88
 49 F.3d at 1015.
89
 Note, however, that the relevant state law may be challengeable as being unlawfully discriminatory 
against individuals with handicaps.  See supra at fn __. 
90 See infra at __.
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The provision -- or non-provision -- of services is close to irrelevant in 
determining whether a particular building is subject to the FHA.  The line instead is 
drawn based on whether the building serves as a home or, on the other extreme, as a 
transitory resting place.91
Specifically, the FHA applies only if the building in question is a “dwelling,”92
which is defined as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or 
designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any 
vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of 
any such building, structure, or portion thereof.”93  The term “family” explicitly is 
defined to include “a single individual.”94
The term “residence,” however, is not defined within the FHA; in the 
absence of a statutory definition, courts have looked to the dictionary for guidance.  
An oft-cited dictionary definition (first employed by a court in 1975) defines 
“residence” as “a temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode or habitation to 
which one intends to return as distinguished from the place of temporary sojourn or 
transient visit.”95  Numerous courts have employed this same definition,96 and as 
recently as 2004.97
91 See infra at __.
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(f)(3) (proscribing various discriminatory acts relating to sale or rental of a 
“dwelling,” or relating to “the provision of services or facilities in connection” with such a “dwelling”).
93
 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b).
94
 42 U.S.C. § 3602(c).
95
 United States v. Hughes Mem’l Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 549 (W.D. Va. 1975) (FHA applies to 
“‘residential center’ for dependent, neglected or needy children”).
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In identifying those buildings that are not considered residences, the key 
definitional words are the nouns (“sojourn” or “visit”) rather than the adjectives 
(“temporary” or “transient”).  A hotel or motel, if intended for use solely by short-
stay travelers, is not considered a “dwelling” under the FHA.98 In the vast majority 
of cases, however, temporary housing is liberally recognized as a “dwelling,” 
provided that the individual has nowhere else to live or, more generally, that the 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 881 (3rd Cir. 1990); Casa Marie, Inc. v. 
Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 1993); Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 
F.3d 1096, 1102 (3rd Cir. 1996); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169 , 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“Most courts 
that have considered the scope of the term “dwelling” in the FHA have cited the analysis of United States 
v. Hughes Memorial Home with approval.”) (citation omitted)); Villegas v. Sandy Farms, Inc., 929 F. 
Supp. 1324, 1328 (D. Or. 1996); Hernandez v. Ever Fresh Co., 923 F. Supp. 1305, 1308 (D. Or. 1996); 
Louisiana Acorn Fair Hous. v. Quarter House, 952 F. Supp. 352, 359 (E.D. La. 1997); Connecticut Hosp. v. 
City of New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (D. Conn. 2001) (“[m]ost courts” using dictionary 
definition).
97 Home Quest Mortg. LLC v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (D. Kan. 2004) 
(“courts have widely followed the definition of this term as first set forth in United States v. Hughes 
Memorial Home”).
98
 Patel v. Holley House Motels, 483 F. Supp. 374, 375, 381 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (citing dictionary definition 
from Hughes Mem’l Home).  Of the cases discussed in this section, Patel is anomalous in that it does not 
concern a zoning or similar dispute.  The motel’s owner allegedly refused to sell the motel after learning 
that two of the prospective buyers were of Indian origin.
A jail cell also is not considered a dwelling, although in that instance the exclusion from FHA coverage 
is due not to shortness of stay, but to the incompatibility of housing rights with incarceration. Garcia v. 
Condarco, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161-63 (D.N.M. 2000); Gold v. Griego, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14897, 
at *6-8 (D.N.M. 2000).
Fair Housing Is Good Medicine
Page 31
housing in question is “home” for at least the short term.  Courts rightly cite the 
FHA’s remedial purpose, as well as the common-sense proposition that the FHA’s 
protections are particularly important for those individuals on the margins of the 
housing market.99
Homeless shelters too are generally considered dwellings,100 as are 
farmworker camps.101  In reference to homeless shelters, a federal district court 
pointed out that
the homeless are not visitors or those on a temporary sojourn in the sense 
of motel guests. Although the Shelter is not designed to be a place of 
99 See, e.g., Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1105-106 (3d Cir. 1996); Casa Marie, Inc. 
v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 1993); Connecticut Hosp. v. City of New 
London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132-33 (D. Conn. 2001); Villegas v. Sandy Farms, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1324, 
1328 (D. Or. 1996); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1173-74 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
100
 See, e.g., Turning Point v. City of Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1996) (assuming without discussion 
that FHA applies to homeless shelter); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Waterford, 808 F. 
Supp. 120 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (assuming without discussion that FHA applies to residence for homeless 
persons with AIDS); Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm’n, 790 F. 
Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992) (assuming without discussion that FHA applies to residence for individuals 
with AIDS who are homeless or at risk of becoming homeless); but see Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4 
(D. D.C. 1991) (“It is, moreover, doubtful if ‘emergency overnight shelter,’ as the District conceives itself 
to be providing, i.e., a place of overnight repose and safety for persons whose only alternative is to sleep in 
alleys or doorways, can be characterized as a ‘dwelling’ within the meaning of the Act, even if it may seem 
like home to them.”).
101 Lauer Farms v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 986 F. Supp. 544, 559 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Villegas 
v. Sandy Farms, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (D. Or. 1996); see also Hernandez v. Ever Fresh Co., 923 F. 
Supp. 1305, 1308 (D. Or. 1996) (concluding with little analysis that FHA applies to farm labor camp).
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permanent residence, it cannot be said that the people who live there do 
not intend to return -- they have nowhere else to go. As recognized by the 
Hughes and Baxter courts,102 the length of time one expects to live in a 
particular place does [sic] is not the exclusive factor in determining 
whether the place is a residence or a “dwelling.” Because the people who 
live in the Shelter have nowhere else to “return to,” the Shelter is their 
residence in the sense that they live there and not in any other place.103
Similar reasoning applies in the farmworker cases. During the approximately five 
months of the growing season, farmworker camps or cabins are considered “dwellings” 
because they are “home” for farmworkers and their families, even if the farmworkers 
maintain homes in another state.104
Many cases concern claims by group homes or similar facilities that they 
are being prevented from operating in a particular neighborhood.  Courts routinely 
conclude that a group home is a “dwelling” under the FHA; more often than not, 
102
 “Hughes” is United States v. Hughes Mem’l Home, the case which first employed the dictionary 
definition of “residence.”  “Baxter” is the subsequently-discussed case of Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 
F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989), in which an AIDS hospice was found subject to the FHA.  See infra at ___.
103 Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1173-74 (N.D. Ill. 1995).  Woods concerns a claim by female 
residents of the shelter that they were sexually assaulted by male employees. 
104 Lauer Farms v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 986 F. Supp. 544, 559 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Villegas 
v. Sandy Farms, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (D. Or. 1996).  In Villegas, farmworkers alleged that they 
had been denied housing because they had children.
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courts reach this conclusion implicitly, accepting the application of the FHA as a 
given.105
When applicability of the FHA has been litigated explicitly in the group 
home setting, courts have found that the group home is “home” for the individuals 
in question, and have determined that the provision of services does not lessen the
FHA’s applicability.  It would be a perverse interpretation of the FHA, in one
court’s views, if the provision of necessary services were to negate the FHA’s 
protections:
The court declines to accept the argument that, because plaintiffs live in an 
environment that is conducive to the recovery process, that environment 
changes the nature of the place where they live from a residence to that of 
a rehabilitative facility. If this were the case, then any group living 
105 City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725 (1995) (group home); New Jersey Coalition of 
Rooming & Boarding House Owners v. Mayor of Asbury Park, 152 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998) (rooming and 
boarding house); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993) (community 
living arrangement); Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991) (group home); 
ReMed Recovery Care Ctrs. v. Township of Willistown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (group home 
for brain-injured adults); Epicenter of Steubenville v. City of Steubenville, 924 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Ohio 
1996) (adult care facility); United States v. Massachusetts Indus. Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21, 26 n.2 (D. 
Mass. 1996) (residential school for emotionally disturbed adolescents); Martin v. Constance, 843 F. Supp. 
1321 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (group home); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 
1285 (D. Md. 1993) (group home); North Shore-Chicago Rehab., Inc. v. Vill. of Skokie, 827 F. Supp. 497 
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (residence for brain injured adults); Horizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Upper 
Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (group home).
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arrangement that facilitated recovery of a handicapped person would lose 
the protections of the FHA.106
Such reasoning, both explicit and implicit, has led to the application of the 
FHA to hospices107 and nursing facilities.108  In affirming the FHA’s applicability 
to a nursing facility, the Third Circuit noted that “[t]o the handicapped elderly 
persons who would reside there, [the nursing facility] would be their home, very 
often for the rest of their lives.”109
In accord with this line of reasoning, courts also have not hesitated to apply the 
FHA to assisted living facilities.  Each case concerns an assisted living facility’s
106 Connecticut Hosp. v. City of New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (D. Conn. 2001) (group housing 
for individuals undergoing outpatient treatment or substance abuse).
107 Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 731 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (denial of special use permit for 
hospice for individuals with AIDS); Ass’n of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & 
Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990) (same).
108 Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. N.J. 2002) (zoning 
board’s refusal to grant variance for nursing facility); United States v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220 
(D.P.R. 1991) (Puerto Rican agency’s refusal to grant permit for operation of nursing facility); Caron v. 
City of Pawtucket, 307 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D.R.I. 2004) (longtime retirement home denied licensure to 
operate as nursing facility); United States v. Lorantffy Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (U.S. 
Justice Department alleging racial discrimination by nursing facility operator).  The Lorantffy opinion 
never classifies the Lorantffy Care Center, but it is identified as a nursing facility in the press release of the 
filing of the action, and on the Medicare program’s Nursing Home Compare website.  See 
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1997/February97/054cr.htm (press release); 
www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/home.asp (Nursing Home Compare website). 
109 Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1102 (3d Cir. 1996) (refusal to grant zoning 
variance for nursing facility).
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challenge under the FHA to a zoning decision; in none of the cases did the defendants 
challenge the facility’s classification as a “dwelling.”110  Like a nursing facility, the
assisted living facility clearly was “home” for its residents.
It should be noted that no case has suggested that “dwelling” under the FHA is to 
be interpreted differently in relation to the no-inquiry regulation, from how it is 
interpreted in relation to other types of issues or disputes arising under the FHA.  As 
110 See Assisted Living Assocs. L.L.C. v. Moorestown Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 414-416 (D.N.J. 1998)
(“spot-zoning” to prohibit operation of assisted living facility); Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 102 
F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1996) (zoning rules requiring neighborhood approval for operation of adult foster 
care home “hous[ing] six elderly disabled residents who suffer from Alzheimer's disease and other forms of 
dementia, organic brain syndrome, and other ailments); Sunrise Dev., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 62 F.
Supp. 2d 762, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (rezoning to prohibit construction of “congregate care facility . . . 
provid[ing] such services as assistance with bathing, dressing, bathroom usage, taking medicine and other 
similar daily living activities”); Town & Country Adult Living, Inc. v. Vill./Town of Mt. Kisco, 2003 WL 
21219794, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denial of variance to expand assisted living 
facility); Barry v. Town of Rollinsford, 2003 WL 22290248, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17800 (D.N.H. 2003)
(refusal to grant exception to build assisted living facility); see also Weinstein v. Cherry Oaks Retirement 
Community, 917 P.2d 336, 338 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (“personal care boarding home,” at the time the term 
used in Colorado for an assisted living facility; application of the Colorado Fair Housing Act, recognized as 
“almost identical” to the federal FHA, in discrimination claim brought by resident against facility).
One anomaly in this line of authority is a case in which a building was to contain housing for physically 
disabled older adults in the upper floors, along with an adult day care facility on the ground floor.  Because 
the adult day care facility was to provide services to the entire community – not just to the building’s 
residents – the Ninth Circuit concluded that the FHA’s accommodation requirement did not apply in 
relation to the adult day care facility.  Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 307 (9th Cir. Cal. 1997); 
see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (FHA’s accommodation requirement).
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discussed, the definition of “dwelling” has been addressed most frequently in zoning-
related disputes.  If long-term care facilities are treated as “dwellings” in zoning-related 
disputes (and they are), then they also should be treated as “dwellings” for purposes of 
the no-inquiry regulation.111
Administrative Commentary
The reasoning of these cases is supported by two federal administrative 
pronouncements.  In 1991, accompanying the release of the ADA regulations, the Justice
Department addressed in a preamble the relationship between the ADA and the FHA.112
The ADA applies to “public accommodations,” including a “service establishment” such 
as a hospital, or a “social service center establishment” such as a senior citizen center or a 
homeless shelter.113  Also, unlike the FHA, the ADA’s “public accommodations” 
classification applies to hotels, motels, and other short- term “places of lodging.”114
The Justice Department explained that a residential facility with services, such as 
a nursing facility or an assisted living facility, might be covered under both the ADA and 
the FHA.115 Under the ADA, the inquiry focuses on whether a residential facility “is
intended for or permits short-term stays [so as to be categorized as a “place of lodging”], 
or appropriately can be categorized as a service establishment or as a social service 
111 See, e.g., Assisted Living Assocs. L.L.C. v. Moorestown Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 414-416 (D.N.J. 
1998).
112 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App’x B.
113
 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), (K).
114
 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A).
115 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App’x B. at 679 (reference to “nursing homes [and] residential care facilities”).
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establishment.”116  The FHA inquiry is to be independent, based on the FHA standards.117
Thus, enactment of the ADA – and more specifically, the ADA’s explicit coverage of 
“service establishments” and “social service center establishments” – did not indicate any
intent by Congress to reduce the FHA’s application to residential facilities that provide 
services.
Three years later, in 1994, HUD issued supplementary guidelines to address the 
FHA’s accessibility requirements for new construction.118  In response to a question 
regarding application of the FHA to continuing care facilities – defined as facilities that 
“incorporate housing, health care and other types of services” – HUD explained such a 
facility’s status as a “‘dwelling’ . . . depend[ed] on whether the facility [was] to be used 
as a residence for more than a brief period of time.”119 Three factors were to be 
considered:
(1) the length of time persons stay in the project;
116 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App’x B. at 679 (reference to “nursing homes [and] residential care facilities”); see 
also Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1006 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) (case against nursing 
facility submitted to jury under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), after court and 
counsel agreed that “standards and proofs” under Section 504 and ADA were similar, and so there was no 
need to submit the ADA claim); Lindgren v. Camphill Vill. Minn., Inc., 2002 WL 1332796, at 5-7, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11078, at 20-22 (D. Minn. 2002) (refusal to grant summary judgment against ADA claim 
made by autistic resident against “family-style” community).
117 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App’x B. at 679 (reference to “nursing homes [and] residential care facilities”).
118
 59 Fed. Reg. 33,362 (June 28, 1994); see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (FHA’s new construction 
requirements).
119 59 Fed. Reg. at 33,364 (June 28, 1994).
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(2) whether policies are in effect at the project that are designed and intended to 
encourage or discourage occupants from forming an expectation and intent to 
continue to occupy space at the project; and
(3) the nature of the services provided by or at the project.120
These guidelines are consistent with case law in focusing on the length and nature 
of the stay as the key factors in determining whether a particular facility is a dwelling 
subject to the FHA.121  Provision of services is only relevant, per factor #3, to the extent 
that the service sheds light on whether resident is meant to be in a facility for a short 
period of time.
It is noteworthy too that the FHA itself contemplates that some “dwellings” will
provide services.  A central FHA provision prohibits discrimination “in the provision of 
services or facilities in connection with such dwelling.”122  Also, discrimination is 
defined to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, 
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such 
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”123  Of course, it is not obvious that 
these “services” include the types of services provided by long-term care facilities.  
Arguably, the terms “services” and “facilities” are meant to refer to such routine 
120 59 Fed. Reg. at 33,364 (June 28, 1994).
121 See supra at ___.
122
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2).
123
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
Fair Housing Is Good Medicine
Page 39
amenities as lawnmowing and laundry rooms.  On the other hand, there is nothing in the 
statute or the regulations that compels such a limited reading of either word. 124
The No-Inquiry Rule Applies Only to Initial Applicants,
and Not to Existing Tenants
By its terms, the FHA’s no-inquiry regulation applies to applicants but not to 
existing tenants or residents.  The relevant subsection (c), in its entirety, states:
(c) It shall be unlawful to make an inquiry to determine whether an applicant for a 
dwelling, a person intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented or 
made available, or any person associated with that person, has a handicap or to 
make inquiry as to the nature or severity of a handicap of such a person.  
However, this paragraph does not prohibit the following inquiries, provided these 
inquiries are made of all applicants, whether or not they have handicaps:
(1) Inquiry into an applicant’s ability to meet the requirements of 
ownership or tenancy;
(2) Inquiry to determine whether an applicant is qualified for a dwelling 
available only to persons with handicaps or to persons with a particular 
type of handicap;
(3) Inquiry to determine whether an applicant for a dwelling is qualified 
for a priority available to persons with handicaps or to persons with a 
particular type of handicap;
(4) Inquiring whether an applicant for a dwelling is a current illegal abuser 
or addict of a controlled substance;
124 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (b)(4) (referring without elaboration to “privileges, services or facilities”).
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(5) Inquiring whether an applicant has been convicted of the illegal 
manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance.125
Despite the fact that the no-inquiry regulation refers to applicants but not existing 
tenants, a 1991 administrative ruling indicates that existing tenants are protected against 
blanket inquiries about handicaps.126  In the underlying incident, the landlord had called 
the tenant at six a.m., reporting that he (the landlord) had heard that the tenant had AIDS, 
and asking the tenant about the state of the tenant’s health.127  The HUD administrative 
law judge concluded that the no-inquiry regulation did not apply – because the tenant was 
a “sitting tenant” rather than an “applicant” – but found that the landlord’s inquiry had 
violated other, more general, provisions of the FHA and its regulations.128  These 
125 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (emphasis added).
126
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991).
127
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *6, 18 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991).
128
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *13-18 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991).
     The administrative law judge is on very solid ground in concluding that the no-inquiry regulation does 
not apply to sitting tenants.  The no-inquiry provisions pertain to “an applicant for a dwelling, a person 
intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented or made available, or any person associated 
with that person.”  24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c). .”  Notably, this terminology is used only in the “no-inquiry” 
subsection.  The remainder of section 100.202 refers more broadly to a “buyer or renter; [a] person residing 
in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or [a]ny person 
associated with that person.”  24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a), (b) (subsection formatting omitted).
      Also, as previously mentioned, the no-inquiry regulation is based on analogous Section 504 regulations 
relating to pre-employment inquiries by an employer.  See supra at ___; 7 C.F.R. § 15b.15 (Agriculture 
Dep’t regulations implementing Section 504); 24 C.F.R. § 8.13 (HUD regulations implementing Section 
504); 34 C.F.R. § 104.14 (Education Dep’t regulations implementing Section 504); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 
(HHS regulations implementing Section 504); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,001 (Nov. 7, 1988) (FHA 
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provisions bar discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, in the terms and 
conditions of a sale or rental, and in the provision of services in connection with a 
dwelling.129
To support the conclusion that a no-inquiry rule could be drawn from the general 
provisions of the FHA, the administrative law judge cited the House of Representatives 
Report accompanying the FHA, as well as the preamble to the FHA regulations.130 In the 
section cited by the administrative law judge, the House Report points out that the FHA’s 
“direct threat” provision – that nothing in the FHA requires that tenancy be offered to an 
individual who would be a threat to others’ health, safety, or personal property --
prohibits a landlord from asking “the applicant or tenant questions which would require 
the applicant or tenant to waive his right to confidentiality concerning his medical 
condition or history.”131
In a similar vein, the administrative law judge noted that the preamble “provides 
that a ‘housing provider may judge handicapped persons on the same basis it judges all 
other applicants and residents’, and that the housing provider ‘may not treat handicapped 
no- inquiry regulation drawn from Section 504 regulations on pre-employment inquiries); 54 Fed. Reg. 
3,232, 3,246 (Jan. 23, 1989) (same). If, as is the case, the Section 504 regulations relate only to inquiries 
made of job applicants and not current employees, the FHA’s analogous no-inquiry regulation reasonably 
can be interpreted to apply to rental applicants (and related individuals) but not to sitting tenants.
129
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2); 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a)-(b).
130
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991).
131 H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2191; see HUD v. 
Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991).
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applicants or tenants less favorably than other applicants or tenants.’”132  The 
administrative law judge also quoted the preamble for the proposition that a “‘housing 
provider may consider for all applicants, including handicapped applicants, such 
concerns as past rental history, violations of rules and laws, [or] a history of disruptive, 
abusive, or dangerous behavior.’”133
This analysis led the administrative law judge to conclude that the landlord’s 
early-morning call was a violation of the FHA and its regulations -- even if, as the 
opinion acknowledged, “the text of the statute and corresponding regulation leave some 
fog over the question of whether Congress meant to protect sitting tenants as well as 
applicants from certain inquiries.”134  Regardless of this “fog”, the administrative law 
judge stated his conclusion broadly:
Thus, since the House Report and preamble appear to support the 
interpretation that sitting tenants are included, and since there is no reason 
readily imaginable or argued to support the concept that Congress would 
intend protection from intrusive questioning for prospective tenants, but 
132
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991); quoting from 24 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. 
A, App. I at 577 (1990).
133
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991); quoting from 24 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. 
A, App. I at 577 (1990) (emphasis in original).
134
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991); see, e.g. 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,001 
(Nov. 7, 1988) (discussion accompanying release of proposed no-inquiry rule, stating that “legislative 
history of the Fair Housing Amendments Act makes it clear that the Act was intended to prohibit landlords 
and owners [from] asking prospective tenants and buyers blanket questions about the individuals’ 
disabilities”) (emphasis added).
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not sitting tenants, I find that section 804(f) of the Act [42 U.S.C. § 3604] 
and 24 CFR 100.202 provide that owners of housing do not have the right 
to ask sitting tenants, as well as prospective tenants, blanket questions 
about their disabilities. As argued by the Government, permitting 
landlords to ask their sitting tenants blanket questions about their 
disabilities that bear no relationship to the health of others would create an 
“open season” on the privacy rights, sensibilities and civil rights of 
persons with disabilities, and would thereby violate the Act and 
regulations.135
An exception was noted:  “However, although blanket questioning of sitting and 
prospective tenants as to their disabilities is not permissible, certain inquiries of 
individual tenants may be permissible,”136 if there exists a “‘a nexus between the fact of 
the individual’s tenancy and [an] asserted direct threat’ to the health or safety of other 
individuals.”137  Absent such a nexus, according to the administrative law judge, “such an 
inquiry is impermissible under the [FHA].”138
With much more limited analysis, a federal district court made a similar statement 
in a case involving a federally-subsidized housing project that had inquired into tenants’ 
ability to live independently:
135
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991).
136
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991).
137
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991); quoting from H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, 
at 29 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2190.  The administrative law judge mistakenly cites to 
page 30 of the House Report, rather than page 29.
138
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991). 
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Although a landlord may make necessary inquiries to determine an 
applicant’s qualifications for tenancy, the landlord may not inquire into 
the nature and extent of an applicant’s or tenant’s disabilities beyond that 
necessary to determine eligibility.139
The court does not specify whether it is relying on the no-inquiry regulation itself, or on 
the broader statutory prohibitions.  Unlike the administrative law decision discussed 
immediately above, the court never addresses the fact that the no-inquiry regulation by its 
terms applies only to an “applicant.”140
These conclusions of the administrative law judge and the federal district court 
may well be correct in a typical landlord-tenant context.  Generally, a landlord has no 
legitimate need for information about a tenant’s health condition, and allowing such 
inquiries would indeed intrude upon the privacy of individuals with disabilities.141
139 Niederhauser v. Independence Square Hous., 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 16,305, 
at 16,305.5 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (emphasis added).
140 Niederhauser v. Independence Square Hous., 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 16,305, 
at 16,305.5 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see supra at ___; but see Lauren Sturm, Fair Housing Issues in Continuing 
Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs): Can Residents be Transferred Without Their Consent?, 6 N.Y. 
City L. Rev. 119, 127 (2003) (concluding that “Niederhauser v. Independence Square Housing extended 
the regulation to cover existing tenants”).
141 But see In re Kenna Homes Coop. Corp., 557 S.E.2d 787, 799 (W.Va. 2001)) (if tenant requests 
accommodation for “a disability which is not apparent to a person untrained in medical matters, it is 
reasonable for a landlord . . . to require a second concurring opinion from a qualified physician . . . to 
substantiate the tenant’s need”); see also  Prindable v. Ass'n of Apt. Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. 
Supp. 2d 1245, 1255 n.22 (D. Haw. 2003) (quoting same language from In re Kenna Homes Coop. Corp.); 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (under FHA, landlord’s obligation to make reasonable accommodation).
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Neither Williams nor Niederhauser, however, supports a per se rule against 
inquiries of sitting tenants.142 Properly understood, the relevant issue in each is whether a 
specific inquiry can be considered handicap-based discrimination in rental, the terms and 
conditions of rental, or the provision of services related to rental.143
In fact, the conclusions of Williams and Niederhauser do not transfer to a long-
term care context. Unlike apartment tenants, long-term care operators have a legitimate 
need for information about residents’ disabilities and health care needs, in order to plan 
and provide care.  There is a world of difference between a landlord inquiring into a 
tenant’s AIDS or ability to live independently, and a long-term care operator seeking 
information for the purposes of care planning.  For good reason, the administrative law 
judge in HUD v. Williams, and the federal judge in Niederhauser, concluded that the 
landlords’ inquiries were discriminatory conduct proscribed by the FHA and its 
regulations.144 That same conclusion, however, often would not hold in the long-term 
care context, because the inquiry from the facility operator likely might be driven not by 
animus or prejudice, but by a legitimate desire – indeed, an obligation -- to provide 
appropriate care.145
142
 The only per se rule here is the no-inquiry regulation that by its terms applies to applicants but not 
tenants.  See 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c).
143
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2); 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a)-(b).
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2); 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a)-(b).
145 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2)-(3), 1396r(b)(2)-(3) (assessments and care plans in nursing 
facilities); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b), (k) (same); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4659(2) (individualized service plan 
for each assisted living resident “developed with the resident, the resident’s representative and resident’s 
legal representative if any, the assisted living operator, and if necessary a home care services agency”).
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The administrative law judge in HUD v. Williams acknowledged that a post-
admission inquiry from a landlord might be appropriate given the proper “nexus” 
between a tenant’s handicap and the safety of other individuals – in other words, if the 
tenant’s handicap was a matter of the landlord’s legitimate interest.146  In the long-term 
care context, the resident’s care needs legitimately are of concern to the facility operator, 
and there is an obvious nexus between a resident’s handicaps and the operator’s 
obligation to provide necessary care services.
Thus, in general, the FHA should not prohibit a long-term care facility from 
requesting and obtaining medical information from existing residents.  The no -inquiry 
regulation applies only to applicants, and the FHA’s relevant statutory language is not 
violated by post-admission inquiries related to assessments and care planning.
     The operators’ legal obligations to provide care – obligations derived both from federal and state quality 
of care standards, and from contractual obligations to residents – distinguish the long-term care setting 
from those situations in which a landlord intervenes on behalf of a tenant who does not want any 
interference.  The facility operator is not a meddling do-gooder, but is performing services as required by 
law and contract.  Cf. Larkin v. Michigan Dep’t  of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(discrimination under FHA not excused by benign intent); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery 
County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1295 (D. Md. 1993) (same); Horizon House Developmental. Servs., Inc. v. 
Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same).
146
 HUD v. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 1991).  By allowing inquiries in certain 
circumstances into a tenant’s dangerousness, the administrative law judge establishes that a no-inquiry rule 
for sitting tenants is not equivalent to the no-inquiry regulation as applied to applicants.  As discussed 
previously, HUD explicitly declined in the regulation to allow pre-admission inquiries regarding an 
applicant’s potential threat to others.  See supra at ___.
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Does an Exception to the No-Inquiry Regulation Allow a Long-Term 
Care Facility to Obtain Medical Information from an Applicant?
Still to be addressed is the right of a long-term care facility to make inquiries of 
applicants regarding their health conditions and disabilities. As discussed above, the no-
inquiry regulation contains five exceptions.147 Of these five exceptions, two related
exceptions are relevant to the types of inquiries typically made by long-term care living 
facilities during the admission process.148  One exception applies when a handicap or 
particular type of handicap is a prerequisite for admission; the other applies when a 
handicap or particular type of handicap gives priority for admission.149
Overview of Exceptions
Handicap as Prerequisite
Specifically, the “han dicap as prerequisite” exception states that the no-inquiry 
regulation does not prohibit an “[i]nquiry to determine whether an applicant is qualified 
for a dwelling available only to persons with handicaps or to persons with a particular 
type of handicap.”150 Regarding the interpretation of this provision, the little available 
legal authority is focused generally on situations in which subsidized housing has been 
reserved for individuals with handicaps.  In the release of the proposed regulations, HUD 
explained:
For example, some Federal and State housing programs are designed for, 
and occupied by, persons with handicaps.   Only persons with handicaps 
147 See supra at ___.
148
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2).  
149
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2)-(3).
150
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2).  
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are eligible to live in such dwellings.   The owner or operator of such a 
housing facility may inquire of applicants to determine whether they have 
a handicap for the purpose of determining eligibility.151
In the release of the final regulations, HUD again emphasized the necessity of 
inquiries in determining eligibility for subsidized housing.  In response to various public 
comments, however, HUD broadened its discussion, and the broadened discussion 
included discussion of eligibility for non-subsidized housing:
[S]ome of these commenters recognized that the ability to make these 
inquiries often is necessary to determine eligibility for government 
housing programs; for example, some Federal and State housing is 
designed for, and occupied by, persons with handicaps.  Only persons with 
handicaps are eligible to live in such dwellings.  Beyond this, as the 
Department explained in the proposed rule, the Fair Housing Amendments 
Act does not prohibit the exclusion of non-handicapped persons from 
dwellings.  A privately owned unsubsidized housing facility may lawfully 
restrict occupancy to persons with handicaps.  The owner or operator of 
such a housing facility must therefore be permitted to inquire of applicants 
to determine whether they have a handicap for the purpose of determining 
eligibility.152
Case authority is slight.  As discussed previously, the FHA does not prevent a 
housing provider from limiting admission to applicants with certain types of disabilities
151 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,001 (Nov. 7, 1988).
152
 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,246 (Jan. 23, 1989).
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but denying admission to applicants with other types of disabilities, when the housing has 
been subsidized by government programs that authorize such criteria.153
Handicap as Priority
Commentary and case authority also are limited in regards to the second 
exception, relating to priority for admission.  In the release of the proposed regulation, 
HUD gave an unsurprising example of how a handicap might qualify an applicant for 
priority in admission:
A housing provider may choose to offer some or all of its units to persons 
with handicaps on a priority basis and may inquire whether applicants 
qualify for such a priority. For example, a housing provider may offer 
accessible units to persons with mobility impairments on a priority basis 
and may ask applicants whether they have a mobility impairment which 
would qualify them for such a priority. 154
HUD’s discussion in the release of the final regulation is almost identical, but 
with one additional instruction.  The discussion again gives the example of a priority for 
applicants with mobility impairments, and then adds the admonition that a housing 
153 Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apts., Inc., 192 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1999); (National Housing Act 
allowing landlord to serve residents with physical disabilities, but to reject applicants with chronic mental 
illness); Jainniney v. Maximum Independent Living, Memorandum of Opinion, No. CV 0879 (N.D. Ohio 
Feb. 9, 2001) (Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act allowing landlord to prefer applicants 
with “similar disabilities”); see supra at __.
154 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,001 (Nov. 7, 1988).
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provider “may not in such circumstances ask applicants whether they have other types of 
impairments.”155
Long-Term Care and Disqualifying Handicaps
Before examining the regulatory exceptions in a long-term care context, it is 
instructive to consider how long-term care facilities differ from apartment buildings in 
their admissions practices.  An important difference – particularly for consideration of 
handicap-based discrimination -- is that certain handicaps can disqualify an individual for 
admission to a long-term care facility.  Such disqualifications are infrequent in nursing 
facilities, but a common reality in assisted living.
Disqualifications are infrequent in nursing facilities because the facilities are 
required to care for virtually any long-term care need.  As mentioned previously, a 
nursing facility has the broad obligation under the Nursing Home Reform Law to 
“provide services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and 
psychosocial well-being of each resident.”156 The Reform Law’s regulations require that 
a nursing facility ensure that a resident have access to a wide variety of “special 
services,” including injections, tracheal suctioning, and care for a colostomy or 
tracheostomy.157
A nursing facility is not a hospital, however, and some medical conditions are 
simply beyond a nursing facility’s expertise.  To cite obvious examples, a nursing facility 
cannot be expected to set broken bones or perform surgery.
155
 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,246 (Jan. 23, 1989).
156 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2), 1396r(b)(2).
157
 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(k).
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In the long-term care context, a more realistic example is ventilator care.  The 
Reform Law’s regulations do not require explicitly that a nursing facility provide 
ventilator care, and only a small (but increasing) minority of facilities do so.158
An inability to provide necessary care is much more a possibility in the assisted 
living context.  In many cases, this inability is a matter of law. State licensure laws 
generally prohibit an assisted living operator from admitting individuals with certain 
handicaps.  In many cases, proscribed handicaps are set forth explicitly in state law.  In 
Wisconsin, for example, a community-based residential facility (a term used by 
Wisconsin for assisted living) is prohibited from admitting an applicant who
• “is confined to a bed by illness or infirmities,” unless the confinement is 
temporary or the individual is receiving hospice care;
• “has physical, mental, psychiatric or social needs that are not compatible with the 
[facility’s] client group or with the care, treatment or services provided by the 
[facility”;
• “is in need of more than 3 hours of nursing care per week,” except on a temporary 
basis;
• “requires 24 hour supervision by a registered nurse or licensed practical nurse”; 
• “has chronic personal care needs that cannot be met by the facility or a 
community agency”; or
158 See, e.g., Bryant v. Indiana State Dep’t of Health, 695 N.E.2d 975, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (nursing 
facility not required to provide ventilator care); GAO, Nursing Home Expenditures and Quality, GAO-02-
431R, at 3 (ventilator care traditionally provided by hospitals, but now being provided by nursing 
facilities).
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• “requires a chemical or physical restraint except” under specified conditions.159
Similarly, an assisted living facility in Virginia is prohibited from admitting an applicant 
with any of the following conditions or treatments:
• Ventilator dependency;
• Stage III and IV pressure sores (except Stage III sores determined to be healing by 
an independent physician);
• Intravenous therapy or injections directly into the vein (except for specified 
exceptions);
• Airborne infectious disease in a communicable state (e.g., tuberculosis);
• Nasogastric tube (feeding tube inserted through nasal passages into stomach);
• Need for around-the-clock nursing care; or
• Total dependence in at least four activities of daily living (e.g., bathing, dressing, 
transferring, toileting, and eating),160 and documented need for the level of care 
provided by nursing facilities.161
159
 Wis. Admin. Code HFS § 83.06(1)(a).
160 See, e.g., Joshua Wiener & Raymond Hanley, Measuring the Activities of Daily Living Among the 
Elderly: A Guide to National Surveys, at 9-16 (1989) (listing and measuring deficits in ability to perform 
activities of daily living); available at aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/guide.htm.
161 Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1805(C).  The list in the text is only a partial listing of the conditions that under 
Virginia law are not allowable in an assisted living facility.
     Some of the listed disqualifying conditions – most notably, the disqualifications under Wisconsin law 
for confinement to a bed, or need for more than three hours of nursing care weekly – might be subject to 
serious challenge under the FHA or ADA for unlawfully restricting access to housing by individuals with 
disabilities.  See supra at fn __ for examples of such challenges.  Disagreement over where to draw lines, 
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In recent years, state assisted living laws generally have become more accepting 
of various health conditions in assisted living facilities.162  The advance guard of this 
movement is represented by those states that allow any condition or treatment to be 
accommodated at an assisted living facility, as long as the facility and a resident agree 
that satisfactory arrangements have been made.163  These state laws generally apply to the 
retention of residents, but not initial admissions.164
Applying the Regulatory Exceptions
Exception When Admission Requires Handicap or
Particular Type of Handicap
No reported case has considered whether a long-term care facility is “a dwelling 
available only to persons with handicaps or to persons with a particular type of 
handicap,” or whether in long-term care “an applicant . . . for a dwelling is qualified for a 
priority available to persons with handicaps or to persons with a particular type of 
however, should not obscure the fact that in long-term care (at least as it is currently structured) some lines 
must be drawn.  An assisted living facility is not the same as a nursing facility, which in turn is not the 
same as a hospital.  It is appropriate that efforts be made to assure that a facility is capable of meeting an 
applicant’s care needs.   
162 See, e.g., Eric Carlson, Critical Issues in Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who’s Providing 
the Care, at 24-35 (2005).
163 See Alaska Stat. § 47.33.020(f); Ind. Admin. Code tit. 410, § 16.2-5-0.5(e); La. Admin. Code tit. 48, 
§§ 8823, 8825; Ark. Code R. & Regs., 016 06 001, § 601.4 (Level I facilities), 016 06 002, § 601.4; see 
also Wy. Code r. 048-20-012, § 8 (outside provider performing services that cannot legally be performed 
by assisted living staff).
164
 Alaska Stat. § 47.33.020(f); Ind. Admin. Code tit. 410, § 16.2-5-0.5(e); La. Admin. Code tit. 48, 
§§ 8823, 8825; Ark. Code R. & Regs., 016 06 001, § 601.4 (Level I facilities), 016 06 002, § 601.4.
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handicap.”165  The answer, as will be discussed, is that a long-term care facility is not 
limited to individuals with handicaps, although a handicap gives priority to an applicant.
As a result, a long-term care facility has a limited right to make inquiries of applicants 
regarding handicaps.
We first examine the handicap-as-prerequisite issue in the nursing facility context.
Perhaps surprisingly, a handicap does not appear to be a condition of admission to a 
nursing facility.  Admittedly neither the Medicare program nor the Medicaid program 
will pay for nursing facility care in the absence of a handicap, but there is nothing in the 
Nursing Home Reform Law that excludes individuals without handicaps.166  Although a 
nursing facility has the right to evict a resident who doesn’t need nursing facility care, the 
facility has no obligation to do so.167  In short, a nursing facility is allowed to admit and 
retain privately-paying individuals who have no handicap whatsoever.168
For the same reasons, nursing facilities by and large are not limited to individuals 
having “a particular type of handicap.”169  As discussed immediately above, a nursing 
165
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2)-(3).  
166
 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(2)(B) (Medicare); 42 C.F.R. §§ 409.31- 409.35 (Medicare), 440.40 (Medicaid).
167 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(2)(A)(ii) (eviction authorized if “the resident’s health has improved sufficiently 
so the resident no longer needs the services provided by the facility”), 1396r(c)(2)(A)(ii) (same).
168
 Of course, as a practical matter, an individual without a handicap generally has no reason to seek 
admission to a nursing facility, but that practical reality does not change the fact in relevant law that  a 
nursing facility is not prohibited from admitting or retaining such an individual.
169
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2).  
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facility generally can admit individuals without handicaps, so it cannot be said that 
admission is limited to individuals with a “particular type” of handicap.170
These same conclusions hold for assisted living facilities also. Like nursing 
facility law, assisted living law does not require a handicap as a condition of admission.
Although “assisted living” is defined in state law as including the provision or 
availability of services, the definitions do not require that any particular individual need 
or use services.171  On occasion, assisted living definitions recognize explicitly that an 
assisted living resident may not need the available services.  In Kansas and Oklahoma, 
for example, a resident’s use of personal care may be due to “functional impairments” or 
“by choice.”172
170 It should be noted that some nursing facilities are licensed specifically for, or claim special expertise in, 
the care of residents with dementia or a similar cognitive disorder.  See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-10-
1501- 1505 (“Alzheimer’s Special Care Standards Act); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1422.5(a)(2)(D) 
(“special care unit or program for people with Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias”); W. Va. Code 
§§ 16-5R-1- 6 (“Alzheimer’s Special Care Standards Act”).  These facilities are not discussed separately in 
this portion of the text because the laws pertaining to specialization do not require a handicap or a 
“particular type” of handicap as a condition of admission.
171 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-27-102(1.3) (definition of  “assisted living residence”); N.J. Admin. 
Code tit. 8, § 8:36-1.3 (same).
172
 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-923(a)(5); Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-890.2(1).
     Admittedly, as a practical matter, an individual without a handicap generally is uninterested in moving 
into an assisted living facility.  See supra at ___ (“handicap” defined broadly); see also Rosalie Kane and 
Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A New Paradigm for Residential Care 
for Frail Older Persons?, at xiii (1993) (study finds that “[a]ssisted living tended to attract tenants more 
disabled than the group which operators targeted initially”).  Assisted living developers have found that 
“the market for assisted living among people who are tired of keeping up a house and just need a little help 
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Also, funding sources will not require an assisted living facility to admit only 
individuals with handicaps, unless the facility is itself a subsidized housing project that 
requires a handicap as a condition of tenancy.173  Although the Medicaid program in 
some states may pay for services provided in an assisted living facility, Medicaid does 
not set general standards for assisted living operations, and thus does not limit residence 
in an assisted living facility to a particular type of resident.  Nothing in Medicaid law 
is rather limited.”  Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, Assisted Living in the United States: A 
New Paradigm for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons?, at 116 (1993).
     In this regard, assisted living facilities as they operate today (as opposed to the idealized visions of the 
early 1990’s) are not comparable to subsidized apartment buildings.  Subsidized rent is attractive to renters 
regardless of their physical condition.  Also, an apartment building’s physical environment allows for 
tenants to come and go with little involvement with the building’s staff.  By contrast, if an individual 
without a handicap were to live in an assisted living facility, she likely would be required to have daily 
interactions with facility staff, even if she were to prefer to go her own way.
     Many assisted living facilities are operated in coordination with unlicensed independent living facilities.  
See, e.g., Appeal of City of Laconia (N.H. Bd. of Tax & Land Appeals), 781 A.2d 1012, 1013 (N.H. 2001)
(complex including independent living, assisted living facility, and nursing facility); see also, e.g., Cal. 
Health & Safety Code § 1569.45 (license required if facility offers “care and supervision” to residents).   
The independent living facility is designed to meet the need of the individual who does not have a 
handicap, but who wishes to live in a community, and who may prefer to be assisted with various 
household tasks.  When the individual’s needs increase, he can receive additional assistance by moving into 
the assisted living facility.  For all of these reasons, an individual without a handicap generally has little 
reason to seek admission to an assisted living facility. 
173 See Robert Mollica et al., State Residential Care and Assisted Living Policy: 2004, at 1-67 through 1-68
(March 2005) (HUD subsidies for assisted living facilities).
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prohibits an assisted living facility from admitting an applicant without a handicap, 
assuming that the assisted living care will not be paid for by the Medicaid program.
Specifically, the Medicaid program can pay for services through personal care 
services174 or, more frequently, a home and community-based services waiver.175  Under 
neither funding option does a Medicaid program set facility-wide standards.176  Although 
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(24); see also Robert Mollica et al., State Residential Care and Assisted Living 
Policy: 2004, at 1-41 through 1-46 (March 2005) (Medicaid personal care services, identified as “state plan 
services”).
175 A home and community-based services waiver (HCBS waiver) allows a state to create a package of 
services specifically for Medicaid recipients who are deemed to require the equivalent of nursing facility 
services, but who prefer to receive those services outside of a nursing facility.  An HCBS waiver can 
provide services in the recipient’s home, or in an assisted living facility.  What is waived are the otherwise-
applicable requirements in Medicaid law that services are available equally throughout a state, that services 
are made available to all eligible recipients in equivalent amount, duration and scope, and financial 
eligibility standards are equivalent for all applicants.  42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (HCBS waiver); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1), (10)(C)(i)(II), (III) (provisions subject to waiver, relating to statewideness; amount, 
duration, and scope; and financial eligibility) ); see also Robert Mollica et al., State Residential Care and 
Assisted Living Policy: 2004, at 1-41 through 1-46 (March 2005) (HCBS waiver services in assisted 
living).
     A recently-enacted amendment to Medicaid law will allow HCBS services to be provided to Medicaid 
recipients who do not require nursing facility services or the equivalent.  See Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat 4, § 6086, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i).
176
 Of course, the Medicaid program will reimburse for personal care services or HCBS waiver services 
only if the Medicaid recipient himself is deemed to have a medical need for such services.  The point of the 
text is that while medical need typically is a prerequisite for Medicaid payment of services, the Medicaid 
program does not require assisted living facilities to impose such requirements on those residents not 
eligible for Medicaid.
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federal law purports to require state Medicaid programs to establish “adequate standards” 
for providers of HCBS services,177 this requirement in practice means little more than 
requiring a Medicaid-certified assisted living providers to obtain an assisted living license 
– the same license required of all assisted living providers, whether Medicaid- certified or 
not.178  Thus, a facility’s receipt of Medicaid reimbursement does not limit admission to 
applicants with handicaps.
Thus, it cannot be said that an assisted living facility is “available only to persons 
with handicaps.”179  As discussed above, neither state licensing law nor federal Medicaid 
law requires an assisted living facility to limit its admissions to individuals with 
handicaps.
Also, as was similarly true for nursing facilities, assisted living facilities are not 
limited to individuals having “a particular type of handicap.”180 Because an assisted 
living facility can admit individuals without handicaps, admission certainly is not limited 
to individuals with a “particular type” of handicap.181
177
 42 U.S.C. § 441.203(a)(1)
178
 GAO, Federal Oversight of Growing Medicaid Home and Community-Based Waivers Should Be 
Strengthened, GAO-03-576 (2003); Eric Carlson, Long-Term Care Advocacy, § 5.04[2][b] (Matthew 
Bender & Co. 2005).
179
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2).
180
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2); see Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apts., Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 606-607 (6th 
Cir. 1999) (National Housing Act allowing landlord to serve residents with physical disabilities, but reject 
applicants with chronic mental illness).  
181
 Assisted living facilities also are similar to nursing facilities in that some assisted living facilities are 
licensed specifically for, or claim special expertise in, the care of residents with dementia or a similar 
cognitive disorder.  See, e.g., Ala. Admin. Code r. 420-5-20-.01(2)(q) (specialty care assisted living facility, 
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It should be noted that a long-term care provider might choose to require a 
handicap or “particular type of handicap” as a condition of admission, even in the 
absence of any legal requirement to do so.182  That possibility is not analyzed here 
because, as a practical matter, long-term care operators do not bother to adopt a policy 
requiring a handicap as a condition of admission.  The broader issue – that long -term care 
facilities are designed for occupancy by individuals with handicaps – is encompassed
below in the discussion of the exception for handicap as a priority.
Exception When Priority Given for Handicap or
Particular Type of Handicap
Although long-term care facilities are not reserved for individuals with handicaps 
or particular types of handicaps, a long-term care facility does give priority to individuals 
with handicaps or (in limited circumstances) a particular type of handicap. The raison 
d’etre of long-term care is to provide necessary services for individuals with 
handicaps.183  Proper operation of a long-term care facility requires the admission of 
“specially licensed and staffed to permit it to care for residents with a degree of cognitive impairment that 
would ordinarily make them ineligible for admission or continued stay in an assisted living facility”); N.Y. 
Pub. Health Law § 4655(5) (additional certification required for any assisted living facility “that advertises 
or markets itself as serving individuals with special needs, including, but not limited to, individuals with 
dementia or cognitive impairments”); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1569.627 (claimed specialization); Del. 
Regs. § 40-300-005, § 63.6 (same); see supra at ___ (nursing facilities specializing in dementia care).   As 
was true in the case of nursing facilities, the specialization laws pertaining to assisted living do not require 
a handicap or a “particular type” of handicap as a condition of admission.
182 See 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,246 (Jan. 23, 1989) (even without legal requirement, landlord may choose to 
restrict occupancy to individuals with handicaps).
183 See supra at ___.
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individuals with handicaps and, for that reason, it can be said that individuals with 
handicaps have priority for admission.184
  For possession of a handicap to be considered a “priority” under the regulation, 
it is enough that the facility is designed specifically to provide needed care for individuals 
with handicaps, and that thus the facility has programmatic incentives to admit 
individuals with handicaps.  As HUD stated in the release of the final no-inquiry 
regulation, a landlord may employ a priority even if the priority is not required by law.185
Also, nothing in the no-inquiry regulation requires that the priority be formal – for 
example, that the facility maintain an admission system awarding bonus points t o 
individuals with handicaps.
Given the absence of case authority, however, it is possible to articulate a straight-
face argument that long-term care facilities do not offer priority to individuals with 
handicaps.  A long-term care facility certainly might have a financial incentive to prefer 
admission of an individual without a handicap, in order to limit expenses, or to maintain 
an image of a facility for “active” seniors.186
184
 In most situations, this priority is a moot point on a practical level.  As discussed above (see supra at 
__), admission to a long-term care facility is appealing only to individuals with handicaps or -- to a limited 
extent in the assisted living context -- to individuals without handicaps who can anticipate having a 
handicap within the foreseeable future.  Long-term care facilities generally are not required to apply a 
priority system in practice, because the nature of long-term care creates an applicant pool that is comprised 
overwhelming of individuals with handicaps.
185 See 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,246 (Jan. 23, 1989).
186 See, e.g., Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002 (3d Cir. 1995) (nursing facility denying 
admission based on applicant’s Alzheimer’s disease); Weinstein v. Cherry Oaks Retirement Community, 
917 P.2d 336, 339 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (ALJ concludes that no-wheelchair-in-dining-room policy was 
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Such an argument is refuted by consideration of the purposes of the no-inquiry 
regulation.  The underlying statute proscribes discrimination on the basis of handicap.187
The no-inquiry regulation promotes the intent of the statute by prophylactically 
prohibiting housing providers from inquiring into an applicant’s handicap, under the 
rationale that the housing provider would use this information to discriminate illegally on 
the basis of handicap.  The exceptions identify those situations in which information 
related to a handicap might be used not to bar or restrict admission, but instead to 
facilitate the applicant’s admission.188
The no-inquiry regulation’s subsection (c)(2) grants an exception when a 
handicap can be a prerequisite for admission.  Subsection (c)(3) is a catch-all provision 
intended to maintain “‘disability-free’ atmosphere”); Rosalie Kane and Keren Brown Wilson, AARP, 
Assisted Living in the United States: A New Paradigm for Residential Care for Frail Older Persons?, at 25 
(1993) (some facility operators preferring “health and fairly independent elderly” but, overall, operators 
generally attracting a frailer-than-anticipated clientele).
187
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2).
188
 The force of this argument is not eroded by the fact that information related to an applicant’s handicap 
may lead on occasion to admission being denied – for example, if an applicant’s care needs exceed the 
level of care offered by an assisted living facility.  In appropriate circumstances, the FHA allows for one 
type of handicap to be preferred over another.  See, e.g., Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apts., Inc., 192 
F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1999) (FHA not overriding National Housing Act provision that allows landlord to admit 
applicants with physical disabilities but not with chronic mental illness); Jainniney v. Maximum 
Independent Living, Memorandum of Opinion, No. CV 0879 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2001) (FHA not 
overriding provisions of Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act that allows landlord to prefer 
applicants with “similar disabilities”).  The no-inquiry regulation itself recognizes that the housing provider 
may have a legitimate interest as to whether an applicant has “a particular type of handicap.”  24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.202(c)(2), (3).
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that covers those situations in which a handicap is not a prerequisite, but nonetheless 
creates a priority for admission.  Subsection (c)(3) should be read broadly, consistent 
with Congressional intent, to include those situations in which housing is designed for, or 
intended for use by, individuals with handicaps.189  Individuals with handicaps should be 
considered to have priority admission for such housing, whether or not the priority is 
formalized.
The priority for a “particular type” of handicap comes into play for long-term care 
facilities that maintain a particular specialization.190  As cited earlier, some long-term 
care facilities follow state standards for specialization in the care of residents with 
dementia or a similar cognitive disorder.191 Recognized facility specializations generally 
vary from state to state, and may include such specializations as mental health services or
ventilator care.192 Any Medicare-certified nursing facility (or “distinct part” of a nursing 
189 See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (“FHA’s ‘broad and 
inclusive’ compass”); Havens Realty Corp v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982) (“broad remedial intent 
of Congress” in FHA).
190
 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(3).
191 See supra at fn __ & __.
192 See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22 , § 72447 (“A special treatment program service distinct part means an 
identifiable and physically separate unit of a skilled nursing facility or an entire skilled nursing facility 
which provides therapeutic programs to an identified mentally disordered population group.”); N.H. Code 
Admin. R. Ann. He-E 802.05(c), (d) (special needs units, both behavioral, and non-behavioral, for nursing 
facilities; non-behavioral unit includes care for ventilator-dependent residents); N.J. Admin. Code tit. 8, 
8:33H-1.6(a) (specialized care beds for ventilator-dependent adult residents, and for “residents with severe 
behavior management problems, such as combative, aggressive, and disruptive behaviors”), 8:85-2.21 
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facility) has a specialization in providing the skilled nursing or rehabilitation services that 
can be reimbursed through Medicare Part A.193
(“special care nursing facility” for residents requiring “extended rehabilitation and/or complex care”); see
also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22, §§ 72443-75 (standards for special treatment program).
     Status as a specialized facility or unit should be limited to those specializations approved by the state 
under state law specific to that specialization.  Otherwise – for example, if a specialization could be based 
merely on a facility’s claim of specialization – a facility might purport to have a multitude of 
specializations, and a facility’s inquiry relative to those purported specializations could require an applicant 
to turn over a substantial portion of his or her medical history.  In point of fact, nursing facilities not 
infrequently claim to be specialists in a plethora of different care procedures.  See, e.g., Fair View Nursing 
Home, available at www.milebluff.com/fair_view_nursing_home.htm (physical therapy, occupational 
therapy, and speech therapy identified as “specialty services” (these services actually are mandatory under 
the Nursing Home Reform Law)); Golden State West Valley Convalescent Hospital, available at
www.goldenstatehealth.com/facilities/goldenstatewv.html (nursing facility “specializ[ing] in caring for 
residents recovering from illness or injury and for those needing continuous, long-term care”); Lorien 
Riverside Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, available at www.lorienhealth.com/riverside (nursing facility 
“specializing in skilled nursing and rehabilitation”); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4)(A)(i), 
1396r(b)(4)(A)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 483.45(a) (under Nursing Home Reform Law, required therapies include
physical therapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, and mental health rehabilitative services).      
193 A Medicare-certified nursing facility “is primarily engaged in providing to residents --
“(A) skilled nursing care and related services for residents who require medical or nursing care, or
“(B) rehabilitation services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick persons.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a)(1); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 409.31- 409.35 (medical conditions qualifying for 
reimbursement under Medicare Part A); Eric Carlson, Long-Term Care Advocacy § 8.05[3] (Matthew 
Bender 2005) (same).
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It is consistent with the FHA and with the no-inquiry regulation for facilities with 
government-recognized specializations to be allowed to inquire into an applicant’s 
condition to the extent necessary to determine whether the applicant has the type of 
handicap that fits within the facility’s specialization.  If, for example, a facility 
specializes in the care of residents with dementia, the facility should be allowed to 
inquire as to whether the resident has been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease or a 
comparable dementia.  If an applicant is otherwise eligible for reimbursement through 
Medicare Part A, the facility should be allowed to inquire as to whether he or she has a 
medical need for the skilled nursing or rehabilitation services that could support Medicare 
Part A reimbursement.194
It should be emphasized that neither of these priority-related exceptions – for 
possession of a handicap or a particular type of handicap -- gives a long-term care facility 
carte blanche to inquire into any and all aspects of an applicant’s medical condition.  
Relevant here are the previously-discussed rulings that allow a federally subsidized 
housing program to require verification of an applicant’s age or disability, but prohibit
     Admission to a Medicare-certified nursing facility is not limited by law to those individuals eligible for 
payment through Medicare Part A.  The facility also may accept private payment or payment though 
private insurance.  If the facility also is Medicaid-certified, it may accept Medicaid reimbursement.
194
 Medicare Part A reimbursement requires that the resident enter the nursing facility within 30 days after a 
hospital stay of at least three nights.  42 U.S.C. § 1395x(i); 42 C.F.R. § 409.30(a)(1).  The skilled nursing 
or rehabilitation services must be provided for the same condition that required the prior hospitalization.  42 
C.F.R. § 409.31(b)(2).  Part A reimbursement for nursing facility is limited to 100 days per benefit period.  
42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2)(A), (b)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 409.61(b).  A benefit period renews itself after the resident 
has not received Medicare-reimbursed hospital care or nursing facility care for a period of at least 60 days.  
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 409.60(b).
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the program from requiring a more detailed physician’s statement.195  Consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the FHA, an inquiry into an applicant’s handicap should be as 
restricted as is practicable.  As noted by a federal district court, “the legislative history of 
the [Fair Housing Act Amendments Act of 1988] and the HUD regulations show that an 
applicant’s privacy rights are to be preserved to the extent possible and that a landlord 
should use the least invasive means necessary to verify an applicant’s qualifications.196
In accord, a long-term care facility at admission should be allowed to inquire into 
an applicant’s medical condition only to the extent that the knowledge is needed to 
determine if the applicant has a handicap, and if the resident has a medical condition that 
cannot be accommodated in the facility.197 Also, if a facility has a formalized
specialization for all or some of its rooms, the facility should have the right to inquire 
into the resident’s medical condition to the extent necessary to determine if the resident 
could benefit from the specialized care. Collectively, the information obtained through 
such inquiries is the information that the facility needs in order to determine if the 
resident is entitled to priority, and to assure that the resident’s admission is not 
prohibited.
195 Robards v. Cotton Mill Assocs., 713 A.2d 952, 954 (Me. 1998); Niederhauser v. Independence Square 
Hous., 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 16,305, at 16,305.5 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see supra at 
__.
196 Niederhauser v. Independence Square Hous., 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 16,305, 
at 16,305.5 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
197 See supra at __, for discussion of state law provisions that prohibit certain conditions from being 
accommodated in an assisted living setting.
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Following this procedure, a long-term care facility would have a right only to a 
limited amount of information.  In most cases, an applicant could demonstrate a handicap 
or type of handicap with the release of only a handful of documents or, possibly, with no 
more than the certification by the applicant or the applicant’s physician of a handicap or 
type of handicap.  Certification by the applicant or physician also could be used to 
establish the absence of a disqualifying medical condition.
Conclusion
The purpose of long-term care is to combine housing with necessary services.  
But, as discussed in this article, this combination raises questions as to the application of 
the Fair Housing Act.  At least initially, the FHA’s no-inquiry regulation appears to be a 
poor fit with long-term care procedures and practices.
Ultimately, the no-inquiry regulation proves to be compatible with long-term care.  
Because long-term care is designed for individuals with handicaps, they are considered to 
have priority for admission, and thus a facility is allowed to make limited inquiries 
regarding any handicaps possessed by an applicant.  After admission, the no-inquiry 
regulation does not inhibit a facility’s care planning in any way, since the regulation does 
not apply once an applicant is admitted and becomes a resident.198
198 See, e.g., Assisted Living Quality Coalition, Assisted Living Quality Initiative: Building a Structure that 
Promotes Quality, at 68 (1998) (initial screening “to determine the setting’s ability to meet the resident’s 
anticipated health and service needs and preferences”; after admission, “a more complete assessment of the 
resident by an appropriately qualified person,” including a “review of physical health, psychosocial status 
and cognitive status and determination of services necessary to meet those needs[, and] information from 
professionals with responsibility for the resident’s physical or emotional health”).
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This analysis should not be seen as merely reconciling extant long-term care
procedures with the Fair Housing Act.  The no-inquiry regulation, in fact, does not 
condone business as usual in long-term care.  Currently, many long-term care facilities at 
admission require extensive medical information – far more than is needed to determine 
if the applicant has a handicap or particular type of handicap, and does not possess a 
disqualifying medical condition.  Application of the no-inquiry regulation properly limits 
a facility’s ability to discriminate on the basis of medical condition.
The FHA not only can be applied to long-term care, it should be applied.199  To 
this point, long-term care facilities generally have not been held accountable under the 
FHA, and the result has been an acceptance of medical-condition discrimination as 
     This progression – an initial light screen to determine appropriateness, followed after admission by a 
more extensive assessment – is comparable to the legally-approved process used in employment decisions.  
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (including their 
implementing regulations), an employer cannot inquire into an applicant’s handicaps, but is allowed to ask 
whether the applicant is able to perform job-related functions.  A hiring decision can be made conditional 
on successful completion of a medical examination, as long as the medical examination is required across-
the-board.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d) (ADA); 14 C.F.R § 1251.203 (NASA regulations implementing 
Section 504); 24 C.F.R. § 8.13 (HUD regulations implementing Section 504); 29 CFR 1630.14 (ADA 
regulations); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (HHS regulations implementing Section 504); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 
45,001 (Nov. 7, 1988) (FHA no-inquiry regulation drawn from Section 504 regulations on pre-employment 
inquiries); 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,246 (Jan. 23, 1989) (same).
199 But see Lauren Sturm, Fair Housing Issues in Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs): Can 
Residents be Transferred Without Their Consent?, 6 N.Y. City L. Rev. 119, 127 (2004) (suggesting that 
application of the no-inquiry regulation might be unworkable in the context of continuing care retirement 
communities).
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simply the way that business is done.  But from legal and public policy perspectives, 
long-term care facilities in fact should not be screening applicants’ medical conditions 
beyond the limited screening allowed under the FHA.
Applicants for long-term care are acutely vulnerable to discrimination, and would 
benefit greatly from active enforcement of the no-inquiry regulation against long-term 
care facilities.  Applicants’ attorneys and HUD each should take steps to investigate and 
then initiate enforcement actions against offending long-term care providers.  The status 
quo – in which long-term care facilities have de facto immunity from the no-inquiry 
regulation – is without legal or moral justification.
